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THE FOUNDING OF THE ART IN EMBASSIES PROGRAM AND THE 
MISREPRESENTATION OF AMERICAN ART 
Zachary Scott Distel 
April 26, 2013 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s New York’s Museum of Modern Art commodified the 
paintings of Abstract Expressionist artists. By commodifying the artwork, the Museum of 
Modern Art could then present it as a product of American capitalism thereby making it a 
powerful diplomatic tool for Cold War diplomacy. This was achieved through the 
Museum of Modern Art’s curatorial decisions, exhibitions, covert dealings by the 
Museum’s leadership, and formalist analysis during the period. Formalist analysis is 
focused on aestheticizing works of art. The State Department’s Art in Embassies Program 
was directly influenced by the Museum of Modern Art and practiced the same 
commodification in its curatorial practices for exhibiting not only Abstract Expressionist 
but also Pop art. This curatorial practice undermined the anti-capitalist goals of both 
Abstract Expressionism and Pop Art. 
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 This thesis explores the invention of the term Abstract Expressionism by New 
York’s Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in the context of United States international 
diplomacy during the 1950s. My inquiry is centered on MoMA’s pivotal influence on the 
development of curatorial practices of the Art in Embassy Program (AIEP) under its first 
director, Nancy Kefauver. Organized by the U.S. Department of State in 1964, the AIEP 
still places original works of American art in diplomatic offices and residences abroad. 
By theorizing the movement as a direct outcome of a capitalist democracy, MoMA 
established Abstract Expressionism as a powerful diplomatic tool. Johnathan Harris 
writes, “the institutional enshrinement of Abstract Expressionism…culminated in the 
Museum of Modern Art’s show The New American Painting, which toured eight 
European capitals in 1958 and 1959.”
1
  This popular notion of Abstract Expressionism 
was asserted through exhibitions, clandestine dealings by MoMA’s leadership, and 
formalist analysis of the artwork.  
                                                          
1
 Johnathan Harris, “Modernism and the Culture in the USA, 1930-1960,” in Modern Art Practices and 
Debates: Practices and Debates, Paul Wood et al (New Haven: Yale University Perss, 1993), 62-3. See 
Appendix 1 for a list of artists included in the exhibition. In the catalog accompanying the exhibition, 
Alfred H. Barr argued that: “Abstract Expressionism, a phrase used ephemerally in Berlin in 1919, was re-
invented (by the writer) about 1929 to designate Kandinsky’s early abstractions that in certain ways do 
anticipate the American movement—to which the term was first applied in 1946.” Here, Barr takes credit 
for inventing the concept of Abstract Expressionism. Alfred H. Barr, “Introduction,” The New American 






 MoMA’s approach to Abstract Expressionism is revealed in its treatment of 
paintings by Jackson Pollock, Robert Motherwell, Mark Rothko, Willem de Kooning, 
and others as commodities. The historical triumph of consumerism, which is evident in 
the commodification that MoMA proposed in its exhibitions in the 1950s, was organized 
to parallel the diplomatic agendas of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, 
irrespective of Congressional and official government opinion of the artwork.  Paul 
Wood defines a commodity as “something which is exchanged in the market for money 
or other commodities”: 
It is usually manufactured or subject to some kind of productive labor or singling out and 
is produced for exchange before its ultimate consumption. Production for private 
consumption is not commodity production; “commodity” is the term given to products 




An important distinction between a commodity and, for example, a good is that the 
former is not produced for immediate or “private consumption,” but is intended to be 
traded in the market. A commodity’s value is predicated largely on its exchange value on 
a commodities market. 
 The American avant-garde of the mid-twentieth century critically engaged or 
disengaged with commodified society. Wood notes that “modern art has been 
fundamentally and doubly marked by commodification”:  
On the one hand this marking extends from the depiction by artists of a world of 
commodities to more diffuse forms of meaning expressive of the effects of 
commodification…On the other hand the productive system of art in the modern period 
itself became commodified. This is an important matter since its effect is implicitly to 
challenge the modernist work of art at its root, insofar as its actual condition as 
commodity within a productive system, an economy, stands at odds with its rhetorical 
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 Paul Wood, “Commodity,” in Critical Terms for Art History, ed. Robert S Nelson and Richard Shiff 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 383-4.  
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When MoMA commodified Abstract Expressionist paintings it negated their purported 
independence from the market as “modernist work[s] of art” as well as the artists struggle 
to be “autonomous, pure, or free” from American capitalism. In its later curatorial 
decisions, the AIEP continued this process by commodifying Pop art, too, neglecting to 
recognize its direct engagement and critique of the denigration of art as mere objects of 
exchange values. Wood describes the fundamental difference:  
The principal ideological underpinning of the concept of expression in art had been the 
claim for its ‘directness’ as distinct from the mediations and conventions of commodified 
modernity. Always philosophically questionable in principle, this claim was now 
exhausted in practice. The commodity had, so to speak, triumphed again.  
 With authentic expression reduced to cliché such truth as was available had now 
to be won not merely from but through the jungle of commodities. The strategy that 
emerged from this in the late 1950s and 1960s was one of citation, born of the perception 




The artists characterized as Abstract Expressionists rejected and withdrew from 
commodified society while Pop artists utilized the symbols and products of commodities 
in their artwork. By the end of the 1950s, Abstract Expressionist painting had become a 
systematic, clichéd method, forcing young avant-garde artists to seek new modes of 
expression. Rather than trying to isolate themselves from commodification, Pop artists 
engaged with it in a critical manner.  
 In the AIEP’s curatorial decisions, Abstract Expressionism and Pop art appeared 
as unvaried parts of the same Cold War consumer culture. The 1959 American National 
Exhibition in Moscow was dominated by a utopian, consumerist vision of capitalist 
culture. Vice President Richard Nixon lauded the prowess of American capitalist society 
to Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev in what would come to be known as the “Kitchen 
Debate.” With the two leaders sparing over the merits and superiority of their respective 
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society’s way of life, it was a contest of capitalist and communist ideologies. Speaking to 
Khrushchev, Nixon declared:  
To us, the right to choose…is the most important thing. We don’t have one decision 
made at the top by one government official….We have many different manufacturers and 
many different kinds of washing machines so that the housewives have a choice….Would 





Consumption was at the heart of the American identity of the 1950s and 1960s. 
 MoMA’s establishment of Abstract Expressionism as a commodity and the 
AIEP’s application of that theory to Pop art rendered the artwork as another product akin 
to washing machines within the context of American capitalism. Historian Elaine Tyler 
May defines the American postwar ideology as “successful breadwinners supporting 
attractive homemakers in affluent suburban homes.”
6
 A “good” American was a prolific 
consumer of products. Thus, Nixon used American products from cleaning supplies to 
refrigerators as the manifest evidence of his society’s superiority. Simultaneously, 
MoMA exhibited Abstract Expressionist works as commodities evidencing the 
superiority of American capitalist society. Examination of the AIEP’s curatorial choices 
and interpretive text demonstrates how it adopted this theory for exhibiting Abstract 
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 Although the United States’ history spans more than two centuries, its 
participation in utilizing art for diplomacy is still young. Only in the last half-century has 
the U.S. government officially supported exhibiting American art in embassies and 
consulates. The first federal program in support of the arts did not occur until the New 
Deal, which created several public art programs such as designing graphic art for 
publications, training draftsmen for industrial sketches, and decorating public buildings 
such as post offices. In comparison to other Western powers in the middle of the 
twentieth century, the U.S. government was far behind in its efforts to support the arts at 
home and especially abroad. In this policy vacuum, instead of the government, private 
initiatives took up the task of promoting American art abroad. 
 Not only did the U.S. government fail to promote the arts, it was unusual in that it 
did not begin a nationally owned art collection until the 1940s. Countries such as England 
and France have vast networks of national art museums filled with collections spanning 
multiple millennia. These collections were drawn upon to decorate foreign office. In 
comparison, U.S. diplomats had no national collection from which to draw artwork.
7
 
While the Smithsonian had been in existence for over a century and the National Gallery 
                                                          
7
 Douglas McCreary Greenwood, Art In Embassies: Twenty-Five Years at the U.S. Department of State 





of Art opened in 1941, their collections were not numerous enough for mass lending to 
diplomatic buildings such as their European counterparts. The vast majority of art in the 
U.S. was, and is, held in private, non-profit collections. This would have rendered the 
search for, organizing, and processing of loans to embassies or consulates much more 
cumbersome and time consuming.
8
 This was especially true because each loan from a 
different institution means a different loan agreement and stipulations on the duration and 
nuances of the loan. In spite of these difficulties, there was still a desire within the U.S. 
government to utilize art for diplomacy.  
 Nelson Rockefeller served as a primary generator of the use of art for diplomacy.
9
 
The first American use of art diplomacy was a series of exhibits organized by Rockefeller 
that went to Latin America during WWII to counter Nazi influence there. He did this 
during his first appointment to a federal position—Coordinator for Inter-American 
Affairs—under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The AIEP considers its earliest roots in 
this office and Rockefeller’s efforts.
10
 The quantity of exhibitions was not prolific, but 
this was not as significant as the fact they took place; Rockefeller established the U.S. 
initiative for art diplomacy.  
 While the U.S. government did not directly support the arts for the majority of the 
twentieth century, there was one other early foray into using art diplomacy in a State 
Department sponsored exhibition. In the summer of 1946 the State Department purchased 
79 oil paintings for a total price of $49,000 from a group of leading modern artists 
including Georgia O’Keefe, Yasuo Kuniyoshi, Jack Levine, and Ben Shahn. A State 
                                                          
8
 Because U.S. diplomats did not have a single, government owned collection to draw upon, a separate loan 
contract would have been required for each loaning institution.  
9
 Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century 
(Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005): 363.  
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Department official explained this unique purchase: “The United States has demonstrated 
its superb ability to manufacture tanks, airplanes, guns, and all the other implements of 
war…The United States must demonstrate that it also has an interest in and a vigorous 
movement in the fields of art, music, and allied fields.”
11
 There was also a more subtle 
rationale for supporting this exhibition. According to Assistant Secretary of State for 
Public Affairs William Benton, “Exhibitions of this kind also make an impact among 
Communists overseas because they illustrate the freedom with which and in which our 
American artists work.”
12
 The initiative was dubbed Advancing American Art and after a 
successful trial exhibition in New York, the collection was divided with one selection 
going to Europe and the other to Latin America. Each exhibition was successful as it 
traveled from city to city. In Prague, for example, the exhibit was so successful that the 
Soviet’s organized a counter-exhibition but it failed miserably, only adding to the success 




 Advancing American Art was cancelled following an outcry of criticism from 
Congress and President Truman as well as some private citizens. In a private letter sent 
April 2, 1947, President Truman expressed his distaste for Advancing American Art and 
modern art in general because much of it was not representational.
14
 The basis for further 
criticism of the exhibition was that it was a waste of tax dollars on “nonsensical ‘modern 
art,’” that the art was of poor quality and taste and did not represent America, and, more 
significantly, that the artists were suspected of “communistic ‘backgrounds’ or 
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 Michael L. Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters For The Human Spirit: American Art and the Cold War (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005): 28. 
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 Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 27.  
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 One of the paintings exhibited was Ben Shahn’s The Clinic, 1941. Shahn 
was born in Lithuania creating a blatant link to communism for critics to attack. His 
painting condemned him further because it depicts two working class women in a 
prenatal doctor’s waiting room where a sign hangs which pictures Christ and the caption: 
“Do I deserve prenatal care[?]” The painting calls attention to a topic deemed 
inappropriate for Cold War America, female sexuality, and advocates for equal access to 
prenatal care regardless of socioeconomic status. Shahn became a favorite villain for 
modern art opponents.  
 The exhibitions were recalled in June 1947 after spending less than a year abroad, 
and over the following months Advancing American Art had its budget drastically 
reduced. The State Department had no choice but to end the exhibition due to the 
communist imputations of its artwork. Critics of the exhibition succeeded in ending it by 
branding it “un-American” and linking it with communism.
16
 With the closing of 
Advancing American Art and in light of State Department statements about never 
exhibiting communist art, according to Frances Stonor Saunders: “the perception of 
avant-garde art as un-American had now been incorporated into official policy.”
17
 The 
closing of the exhibitions drew the battle line for proponents on each side of the modern 
art debate, but, perhaps most importantly, unleashed a public wave of criticism of modern 
art. Many in the art community lamented the lack of support for modern art and the 
significant criticisms coming from officials in the federal government. President Truman 
often liked to arise early in the day to visit the National Gallery before it opened and he  
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 Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 38.  
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Figure 1. Ben Shahn, The Clinic, 1944-45, tempera on paper, 15 5/8 x 22 ¾ in., Georgia 










commented upon viewing the old masters: “It’s a pleasure to look at perfection and then 
think of the lazy, nutty moderns. It is like comparing Christ with Lenin.”
18
 One of the 
most boisterous assaults came from Representative George Dondero of Michigan who 
claimed “All modern art is communistic” and criticized avant-garde styles:  
Cubism aims to destroy by designed disorder. Futurism aims to destroy by the machine 
myth…Dadaism to destroy by ridicule. [Abstract] Expressionism aims to destroy by 
aping the primitive and insane. Abstractionism aims to destroy by the creation of brain-




Following the cancellation of Advancing American Art, critics, artists, and the art 




 Even with the avalanche of criticism that fell on Advancing American Art, a 
number of proponents for art diplomacy survived in the federal government and worked 
to redevelop ways to utilize art. After the political fiasco of Advancing American Art it 
seemed as though the federal government was wholeheartedly against modern art and art 
diplomacy, and many government representatives supported this supposition. This was, 
however, never entirely true. Throughout the 1950s there would nearly always be 
individuals who supported utilizing modern art for diplomacy, but there was little or no 
cohesive effort to defend this position. The federal government, and particularly the state 
department, became immobilized, never being able to fully rid itself of support for 
modern art nor ever be fully in control of official opinion. Those officials in support of 
policies to use art as a diplomatic tool were driven by the escalation of the Cold War as 
well as Soviet cultural programs.
21
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 The real challenge became making art diplomacy amenable to critics which 
required a fundamental shift in how officials perceived modern art. According to Michael 
Krenn, following the Advancing American Art disaster, “instead of as a tool to create a 
better world, art was increasingly portrayed as a weapon that might serve the need of 
American diplomacy and, perhaps, help thwart the march of communism.”
22
 With the 
transition to the Eisenhower Administration looming, proponents began to speak out for 
art diplomacy, and for a particularly American form of art as most representative. 
 Prominent individuals associated with MoMA and its diplomatic agenda for 
modern art described its utility for U.S. international diplomacy. Writing in the Magazine 
of Art, Robert Goldwater, a prominent art historian on the faculty of Queen’s College, 
critic, and curator, asserted: “We do not believe modern art is in any way subversive of 
democracy but rather an expression for American artists.”
23
 In this statement Goldwater 
supported the capitalist vision of Rockefeller and MoMA for modern art.
24
 The use of 
modern art for diplomacy (particularly against communism) was championed by the first 
Director of MoMA, Alfred Barr: “The modern artists’ nonconformity and love of 
freedom cannot be tolerated within a monolithic tyranny and modern art is useless for the 
dictator’s propaganda.”
25
 Art was an exceptionally viable tool for diplomacy not only 
because of the situation presented by the Cold War, but also because “art exhibits 
projected truths about the U.S. beyond language, truths that came nearer than other means 
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 Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 54.  
23
 Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 58.  
24
 Goldwater was well connected in the elite circles surrounding MoMA during the 1950s. He co-curated an 
exhibition with Rene d’Harnoncourt and wrote the catalog for it: Robert Goldwater and Rene 
d’Harnoncourt, Modern Art in Your Life, The Museum of Modern Art (New York: The Museum of Modern 
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Alfred Barr. Goldwater was also the first director for Nelson Rockefeller’s Museum of Primitive Art.  
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to revealing the national style, spirit, and soul.”
26
 The term “art” is very general, 
however, and the debate that raged over it included many styles and mediums. The debate 
was fiercest and most clearly demonstrable in regards to one newly defined style, 
Abstract Expressionism.  
 The American art diplomacy of the mid twentieth century celebrated Abstract 
Expressionism. Ann Eden Gibson describes this avant-garde movement as “a rebellious 
movement…aimed not only to revolutionize representation by superceding America’s 
regionalism, realism, and recognizably national styles like French Cubism, but in doing 
so also to oppose America’s isolationism, imperialism, and ethnocentrism.”
27
 An 
alternate definition is that it is a state of mind. It is characterized by a wide array of artist 
“ranging from the drip paintings of Jackson Pollock to the intensely coloured floating 
shapes of Mark Rothko.”
28
 As a style, however, it was promulgated as distinctly 
American in nature and origin. Frances Stonor Saunders declares that “America’s cultural 
mandarins” championed Abstract Expressionism because it was “non-figurative and 
[purportedly] politically silent, it was the very antithesis to Socialist Realism. It was 
precisely the kind of art the Soviets loved to hate.”
29
 In a politically conscious statement 
made for expressly diplomatic purposes, Nelson Rockefeller declared Abstract 
Expressionism was “free enterprise painting.”
30
 Conversely, the Soviet Union 
championed Socialist Realism, a style aimed at imbuing the greatness of the USSR and 
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communism through visually realistic depictions of the idealized daily life of the 
proletariat. Its images and symbols were portrayed as rigid, monolithic in size, and a 
conglomeration of proscribed attributes rather than original creations. One CIA agent, 
indicating how art might deserve some government support, declared of Abstract 
Expressionism: “We recognized that this was the kind of art that did not have anything to 
do with socialist realism, and made socialist realism look even more stylized and more 
rigid and confined than it was.”
31
  
 Even with praise coming from the private and public sector, those that opposed 
using Abstract Expressionism for art diplomacy found it easy to brand as un-American. 
One aspect that made it an easy target was the fact that Pollock, Rothko, and other artists 
had been Communist activists in the 1930s, spurring a general dislike of Abstract 
Expressionism.
32
 Another fundamental issue was its non-representational basis. It was 
new and while it has figurative predecessors, opponents saw it as highly unfamiliar and 
non-traditional. One opponent went so far as to suggest, “If you know how to read them, 
modern paintings will disclose the weak spots in US fortifications, and such crucial 
constructions as Boulder Dam.”
33
 Abstract Expressionism was the ideal style for 
proponents and the ideal target for opponents.  
  Nelson Rockefeller sought to showcase new American artwork to the world. He 
did not focus on art in general, writes former cultural diplomacy agent Richard T. Arndt, 
but specifically modern art from his native country: “Rockefeller seemed [emphasis 
                                                          
31
 Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, 260. The stark differences between Abstract Expressionism and 
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added] to have had no deeper motive in art export than displaying to the world the quality 
of his country’s artistic production.”
34
 Rockefeller had other more complex motives than 
simply exporting his native country’s artistic achievements. This was evident by his 
involvement in multiple organizations participating in art diplomacy geared toward 
extoling capitalist democracy.  
 Nelson was the grandson of Standard Oil founder John D. Rockefeller and one of 
the five brothers which founded the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The arts were always a 
part of his life and education; due in large part to his mother, Abby Aldrich Rockefeller
35
, 
who was one of the primary founders of MoMA. Rockefeller’s resume during the 1940s 
and 1950s includes several government and private positions which allowed him to 
influence art diplomacy, including the exhibits sent to Latin America during WWII. In 
1954 President Eisenhower appointed Rockefeller his Special Adviser on Cold War 
Strategy. In his private life, Rockefeller was a trustee of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund 
(RBF). The Fund not only sponsored a think tank on foreign policy but also gave him 
philanthropic influence to support institutions and programs of his choice generously. 
Rockefeller’s influence allowed him to sponsor a program that launched art diplomacy 
from an idea to an effort.  
 Under the leadership of Nelson Rockefeller, MoMA created its International 
Program to carry out art diplomacy neglected by the federal government in 1952. 
Rockefeller not only proposed the idea to the Museum board but also provided support 
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from the RBF as its “Treasurer and most active member.”
36
 Rockefeller explained the 
basis of the International Program was to create “exhibitions presenting in foreign 
countries and the United States the most significant achievements of the art of our time, 
with the aim of promoting greater international understanding and mutual respect.”
37
 He 
believed the International Program was necessary because “The United States 
government, unlike those of other countries, had not recognized the need for this form of 
cultural exchange, but it was hoped that the Museum’s initiative might ultimately lead to 
governmental support of a comparable program.”
38
 Following the backlash to Advancing 
American Art, proponents of modern art perceived a bleak situation. This was believed 
not only due to the lack of government programs for exporting American culture abroad, 
but also because Congressional forces were attempting to stymie its very existence. 
According to Helen M. Franc, writing on behalf of MoMA, by 1952 when the 
International Program was initiated: 
The government had either foregone any responsibility for cultural exchange or had 
shown itself completely subservient to the Red-hunting forces in Congress—not only 
Senator Joseph McCarthy’s relatively short lived hearings of the 1950-53 but also the 
much longer-lasting operations of the House Un-American Activities Committee.
39
   
 
The International Program was a capable organization but was unequipped to achieve the 
goals MoMA had for it.  
 A year after the creation of the International Program, the International Council 
was established October 8, 1953. The general purpose of the International Council was to 
serve as an advisory body for the International Program and coordinate with other 
                                                          
36
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institutions across the country to foster the exchange of cultural materials.
40
 Mrs. John D. 
Rockefeller III
41
, serving as its chair, stated of the International Council:  
[it] is to help provide for the interchange or ideas and the exchange of cultural materials 
which can lead to a greater understanding and mutual respect among nations…While 
many national governments abroad have recognized this need and supplied official means 
for this exchange, our own government, particularly in the field of modern art, has left 




Mrs. Rockefeller concisely points out the government’s failure to support art diplomacy 
and eagerness to avoid modern art. Within the first year of the International Council’s 
existence it coordinated with the wife of Ambassador L. Corrin Strong located in Oslo, 
Norway, to send an exhibition of American artwork to hang in the embassy residence.  
 The AIEP considers this exchange the first embassy exhibition in its lineage. It 
would be another decade, however, before the State Department formally initiated the 
program. The exhibition in Oslo was done on a trial basis but laid the foundation for 
future efforts and Mrs. L. Corrin Strong would be an essential character to future 
development. This exchange also solidified MoMA’s position in the legacy of the AIEP.  
 It did not take long for the art-conscious public to notice the International 
Program’s and International Council’s activities. In 1954, Art Digest proclaimed of 
MoMA’s activities:  
‘the naiveté of our officials is in some degree compensated for by the cultural 
sophistication of our private citizens, institutions and agencies.’ This was ‘the most 
effective antidote to the virulent anti-Americanism that exists today all over the world. 
We can be grateful that we have private citizens and institutions of sufficient conscience 




The first exhibition organized by the International Council was 12 American Painters and 
Sculptors. It received extensive press coverage at home and abroad with a diversity of 
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reactions. Significantly, the exhibition was free to display works by controversial artist 
such as Shahn and Pollock because it was privately funded.
44
 The International Council 
did not desire its exhibits to be completely privately funded but did so to maintain its own 
agenda, under the guise of high standards of artistic integrity and quality. At the same 
time the International Council was founded, the federal government also founded a 
program with similar goals use art as a diplomatic tool. 
 President Eisenhower created the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 
1953 opening an avenue for art diplomacy. USIA was established to be an “independent 
organization responsible for all the country’s information activities abroad.”
45
 Its stated 
purpose was “to submit evidence to people of other nations…that the objective and 
policies of the United States are in harmony with and will continue to advance their 
legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace” and to avoid “strident and 
propagandistic material.”
46
 The use of propagandistic material is nearly certain and is a 
discussion for another essay, but it is clear USIA and MoMA shared the diplomatic goal 
of using American “products” to demonstrate the superiority of American society. While 
USIA was created to distribute a vast array of materials, one of its activities was art 
exhibitions. Initiatives like USIA were wholeheartedly supported by another unique 
private organization besides the International Council. 
 Privately organized in 1948, the Committee on Government and Art completed a 
study of the relationship between the arts and government in 1954. Lloyd Goodrich, then 
Associate Director of the Whitney Museum of American Art, was chair of the Committee 
when he wrote: “one of the most essential governmental art activities today should be 
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exchanges of art exhibitions, material [emphasis added] and personnel with other nations. 
In the present world situation, the importance of this is too obvious to need lengthy 
discussion.”
47
 By referring to artworks as “material,” Goodrich uses commodifying 
language that agrees with MoMA’s framework for making modern art into a diplomatic 
tool. Goodrich asserted such diplomacy could not be done without government support. 
In a Committee Report from 1954, Goodrich states:  
[The Committee] recognizes that contemporary art is extremely diverse, including many 
valid but differing viewpoints, and that to represent these viewpoints in a balanced 
manner is one of the chief problems involved. It believes that governmental policies 




Goodrich uses an aestheticizing argument for the artwork by calling for advisory bodies 
free of politics. Such bodies, according to Goodrich, would select works of art strictly on 
their artistic merits, not for their utility as diplomatic tools. Aestheticizing artwork was a 
fundamental aspect of commodification, a topic which will be discussed further in section 
4. The following year, significant figures from the federal government spoke in favor of 
the same idea.  
 Speaking at MoMA in 1955, George Keenan and President Eisenhower affirmed 
their belief in art diplomacy. Both men lauded the efforts of the International Program 
and International Council when they delivered speeches at MoMA. Keenan, the architect 
of Cold War “containment policy” stated at a dinner at MoMA:  
’we are gradually becoming aware for the first time of the frightening extent to which 
negative conceptions about us prevail to one degree or another abroad.’ America was 
increasingly viewed as ‘vulgar, materialistic nouveaux riches, lacking in manners and in 
sensitivity, interested only in making money, contemptuous of every refinement of 
esthetic feeling.’ Therefore it was important to ‘show the outside world both that we have 
a cultural life and that we care something about it.’ If this could be done, ‘I for my part 
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would willingly trade the entire remaining inventory of political propaganda for the 




President Eisenhower also stated at a MoMA dinner in 1955 how he embraced modern 
art as a “pillar of liberty.”
50
 The President elaborated on this sentiment:  
As long as artists are at liberty to feel with high personal intensity, as long as our artists 
are free to create with sincerity and conviction, there will be healthy controversy and 
progress in art…How different it is in tyranny. When artists are made the slaves and the 
tools of the state; when artists become chief propagandists of a cause, progress is arrested 




With the addresses of Keenan and President Eisenhower there were significant 
proponents from the public sector which supported the efforts of the International 
Program and International Council to utilize modern American art for diplomacy.  
 Due to continued opposition throughout the federal government, however, the 
sentiments of Keenan and President Eisenhower were not implemented. One such 
example came when the USIA refused to continue support of an exhibition because of 
some of the artists represented. The exhibition was organized in 1956 in co-sponsorship 
with the American Federation of Art(AFA). It featured 100 paintings by 75 artists, 
“surveying the major trends in American art from the turn of the twentieth century to the 
present, including representative examples from realism to abstraction.”
52
 USIA deemed 
ten of the artists “social hazards”
53
 and demanded the AFA remove them. The AFA 
refused to censor the show so the opinion of the White House was sought to resolve the 
issue. The exhibit was cancelled and from then on “there would be no government 
sponsorship of overseas exhibitions that included paintings made after 1917 (a significant 
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date because it was that of the Russian Revolution).”
54
 Art diplomacy proponents were 
aghast at the President’s actions given his statements a year earlier at MoMA.
55
 The 
President’s actions also demonstrate a further aspect of the government’s inconsistency in 
regard to the official opinion of modern art. Verbal support for the International Council 
as well as the establishment of the USIA came from President Eisenhower, but at a 
decisive moment he discredited modern art for diplomacy.  
 Government officials had once again contradicted their position on the debate 
over modern art by hindering the activities of the USIA. The official policy set by 
President Eisenhower indicated the State Department and USIA would not fully support 
“freedom of expression” or cease blacklisting artists.
56
 Rene d’Harnoncourt, then director 
of MoMA, declared: “since the USIA had to work within a framework determined by 
political, rather than solely artistic[emphasis added], considerations, its presentations 
inevitably were tinged with an atmosphere of propaganda.”
57
 D’Harnoncourt asserts 
MoMA’s dedication to aesthetics, a crucial aspect of the Museum’s commodification of 
the artwork. It was clear the bulk of the initiative for art diplomacy would continue to 
rely on the International Program and International Council. 
 Instead of the U.S. government, MoMA organized the majority of American 
presence and representation at the international art shows held in Venice and São Paulo 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century.
58
 The first Venice Biennale was held in 
1895 and its general purpose was to serve as a world’s fair exclusively for art. U.S. 
representation at the Venice Biennale was privately organized until 1964 when the USIA 
                                                          
54
 Franc, “The Early Years,” 117.  
55
 Franc, “The Early Years,” 117. 
56
 Franc, “The Early Years,” 116.  
57
 Franc, “The Early Years,” 140-1. 
58





took over. In the decade before official support was granted, the international community 
took note of the lack of U.S. government involvement. One of the earliest efforts of the 
International Council as stated in a press release was the “organization of exhibitions for 
the United States Pavilion at the[1954] Venice Biennale, just purchased by funds 
provided for the International Program.”
59
  At the 1954 Biennale where the U.S. 
representation was organized by MoMA, it was the only privately facilitated effort 
among twenty nations.
60
 USIA staff was prohibited from participating because of the 
inclusion of artists such as Shahn in the exhibition.
61
 Just one year earlier at the São 
Paolo Biennale, the U.S. was the only major power not to support its national presence.
62
 
MoMA continued to organize exhibitions in São Paulo, commenting on its efforts in 
1957: “The United States section unlike those of other countries was not government 
sponsored but was organized at the invitation of the Bienal authorities by the 
International Program of [MoMA] …and presented under the auspices of the newly 
established International Council.”
63
 With the International Program and International 
Council organizing the exhibitions, MoMA was free to send a collection of paintings by 
controversial artist Pollock, which was the feature of American representation in 1957. 
The Venice and São Paolo Biennials served as defining moments for official, especially 
State Department, support for the arts, in which the government clearly abdicated its 
ownership.  
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 There were, however, limited instances during the 1950s where the USIA and 
State department provided indirect support. The government programs’ support came in 
the form of subsidizing transportation costs and exhibition catalogues while the 
International Council supported art and artists unable to gain government support.
64
 It is 
important to recognize that by organizing the catalogues, federal agencies were then able 
to control the interpretive texts and critical framework for exhibitions. When the USIA 
staff was prohibited from participating in the 1954 Venice Biennale, it was not due to a 
lack of eagerness on the part of the agency. The ambassador to Italy vehemently opposed 
modern art and thwarted their efforts. In 1955 and 1956, exhibits were held in Barcelona 
and London. Barcelona received assistance from the Embassy in Madrid and the London 
exhibit was done in cooperation with the U.S. Embassy there. Ben Shahn and art 
historian Meyer Shapiro were sent to London to deliver lectures in conjunction with the 
exhibition. Each had their travel expenses covered, Shahn by the International Council 
and Shapiro by the State Department.
65
 One of the purposes for founding the 
International Program and International Council was to encourage government 
participation and support which it did through such collaborations.  
 The exhibitions MoMA was creating were certainly successful in their own right, 
but were not eliciting the desired level of response from Washington. Porter McCray, 
director of the International Program, writing to Rene d’Harnoncourt in 1956 said:  
Especially in view of the USIA’s present orientation and the probability that 
exhibitions assembled under its auspices may become increasingly conservative, 
it seems that The Museum of Modern Art is the only institution likely to 
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organize this kind of representation for showing abroad and our obligation to do 




This lack of response also frustrated the International Council, but allowed it to utilize the 
most contested style of the era—Abstract Expressionism. Throughout the 1950s, writes 
Franc, the International Program’s activities “coincided with the ascendancy of the first 
indigenous American style of modern painting to attract international attention, Abstract 
Expressionism” and its exhibitions, supported indirectly by the world’s foremost 
superpower, “led to recognition of its validity and worldwide influence.”
67
 The 
exhibitions offered a mix of wartime US guests such as Marcel Duchamp with native 
artists and “the mix proclaimed that America had assimilated Europe’s best and become a 
new world art center.”
68
 Abstract Expressionism was the leading American style and 
MoMA’s efforts were pushing it abroad. Even if there were private desires within the 
USIA or State Department to “push Abstract Expressionism, the reality of the McCarthy 
era was that the agency could not co-organize an exhibit of such vanguard art.”
69
 For the 
first time in history the United States was the leader in the art world and sending its art 
abroad, just not in an official capacity. In spite of the government’s inability to directly 
champion Abstract Expressionism it continued to encourage programs to send American 
art abroad, which also coincided with MoMA’s own agenda. 
 These continued efforts resulted in the first program directly related to the AIEP 
and represented a major step toward its creation. President Eisenhower initiated the 
“People to People” program in 1957 which “established a subcommittee on American Art 
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in Embassies and Consulates”.
70
 The program was underfunded and produced few 
results—only 18 paintings were donated to the State Department and fewer than 60 loans 
were made. MoMA recognized the “People to People” program was not succeeding and 
in response began its own embassy program.
71
  
 In 1960 MoMA initiated its Art in Embassies Project that expanded its original 
embassies efforts from 1953. About the project, a May 11, 1960 press release from 
MoMA states: “The purpose of the plan is to make available original works of art for the 
residences of our ambassadors and foreign service officers in order to represent American 
creative achievements and to demonstrate this country’s interest in the visual arts.”
72
 The 
release also traces the history of the “Art in Embassies” initiative:  
The original impetus for ‘Art in Embassies’ was given by Mrs. L. Corrin Strong when 
she and her husband went to Norway when he was appointed United States Ambassador 
there in 1953. At her bequest a number of works of art were lent by the Museum of 
Modern Art and other collectors. The success of this trial experiment led Mrs. Strong and 
other members of the [Art in Embassies] Committee to raise special funds and to 
organize this project so that many United States Embassies in various parts of the world 





MoMA’s Project was sending artwork not only by modern American artists but also 
modern European artists. In spite of the volatile nature of the artwork being utilized by 
the Project, the press release also states: “From its inception, the ‘Art in Embassies’ 
project, which is being administered by the Museum of Modern Art, has benefited from 
the advice and encouragement of the United States Department of State.”
74
 Even though 
the federal government repeatedly expressed its distaste for modern art, the actions of the 
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State Department do not reflect this to be a universal opinion, further evidence of the 
inconsistency of official opinion. 
 Two years after the Project’s creation, reports indicate more embassies began 
displaying controversial artwork. A 1962 press release from MoMA lists Ben Shahn as 
having works in embassies. A separate report also stated that “A unique collection of 
Rothkos hung in Edward Stone’s graceful embassy in [New] Delhi so successfully that 
the embassy had to set up weekend visiting hours.”
75
 MoMA considered the Art in 
Embassies Project as another necessity for it to undertake due to the lack of government 
action. Waldo Rusmussen, then director of the International Council, “characterized its 
project as an attempt to stimulate the government’s involvement in the visual arts.”
76
 That 
is exactly what the Project did although the immediate reaction was of a defensive nature. 
The State Department was concerned with the artwork MoMA was placing on embassy 
walls.
77
 The exhibitions were now encroaching on government property on an ad hoc 
basis at the bequest of ambassadors and other government officials abroad. According to 
Andrew Solomon, writing for the AIEP, while the exhibitions the International Council 
created for embassies were done in cooperation with the State Department, they were not 
sanctioned under any policy. As ambassadors increasingly relied on the International 




                                                          
75
 Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 375.  
76
 Douglas McCreary Greenwood, Art In Embassies: Twenty-Five Years at the U.S. Department of State 
1964-1989  (Washington D.C.: Friends of Art and Preservation in Embassies, 1989): 24.  
77
 Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters, 195.  
78
 Andrew Solomon, “The Art in Embassies Program: The American Tradition of Cultural Diplomacy,” in 
The Art in Embassies Program: In Commemoration of the 40
th
 Anniversary of The U.S. Department of 





 Robert H. Thayer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, wrote a report in 
1961 outlining how the State Department should take over the Project’s activities in an 
official capacity. Thayer’s report represented both sides of the argument over modern and 
contemporary art. He wrote embassies “can and should become windows through which 
the people of foreign countries can see American works of art of all kinds and periods.”
79
 
The artwork going on embassy walls, however, should be selected by a panel which 
would “afford ample protection to the Department on the many controversial issues 
which exist in the field of the arts, particularly in the field of contemporary art.”
80
 The 
panel Thayer called for would protect the integrity of the art, but also the State 
Department from Congressional onslaughts. He outlined a detailed system of checks: 
Ambassadors should be instructed by the Secretary of State that no changes should be 
made in the decoration of the Embassies or of the reception rooms of their residences 
without the approval of the Panel of Interior Design evidenced by a letter from the 




Simultaneously, Thayer also declared that “criticism from the Congress and elsewhere is 
bound to descend on any group making a selection of contemporary art, but this is all the 
more reason for the appointment of a selection committee of the highest quality whose 
distinction and objectivity will with stand all political onslaughts.”
82
  
 Much of the report is dedicated to the machinery of Thayer’s ideal State 
Department operated program, but lacked attention to theory. The Thayer Report was 
largely silent on the fundamental theories or opinions that would dictate the curatorial 
process of the AIEP. Thayer used phrases such as “accurately reflect American life” and 
                                                          
79
 Robert H. Thayer, The Placing of American Works of Art in United States Embassies; A Study and 
Recommendations. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State,1961 , preface 1.  
80
 Thayer, Placing of American Works, preface 1.  
81
 Thayer, Placing of American Works, 6.  
82





offer “some of the cultural impact and flavor of the United States”
83
 to describe his ideal 
kind of art. The report did not name any artists or particular styles other than 
contemporary and traditional. Thayer offered precise machinery to direct decisions, but 
little as to how those decisions should actually be made. It was further evidence of the 
lack of coherency in the opinion of the federal government in regard to utilizing modern 
art for diplomacy. The language in the report was appropriately vague to appease all 
parties. Thayer’s report was a departure from MoMA’s Project when he called for the 
government’s program to only display American artwork.
84
 This was, perhaps, a 
politically savvy concession by Thayer to focus only on American artwork to appease 
conservative Congressional leaders opposed to modern art.  
 Two years after Thayer wrote his report President Kennedy acted on the 
suggestions and created the AIEP. The last appointee President Kennedy made before his 
assassination in 1963 was Nancy Kefauver to head the AIEP. The wife of the late Senator 
Estes Kefauver, Kefauver had taken art lessons in her native Scotland as well as in Paris, 
and was an amateur artist. She possessed little professional training as a curator and had 
not been highly active in the arts community since her youth. Later in his life, Thayer 
candidly wrote to a colleague: “Unfortunately, the first appointee [of the AIEP] was a 
purely political one, Mrs. Kefauver, who had had no experience in the arts and whose 
taste, frankly, was subject to considerable question.”
85
 Despite her lack of experience, 
with little funding and a limited staff Kefauver aggressively began sending artwork to 
embassies following in MoMA’s footsteps.  
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 While differing in certain aspects politically, the AIEP was an extension of the 
International Council’s Art in Embassy Project. The AIEP had two stated purposes at its 
founding. One was to “enhance the physical beauty of the embassy residences,” but more 
significantly was “to suggest the depth and quality of a nation that in a little over two 
hundred years had come of age culturally.”
86
 At its founding, the AIEP “sent 
contemporary or recent work abroad” and “The early emphasis on newer material was an 
outgrowth of the policies of the International Council.”
87
 The AIEP adopted and 
continued MoMA’s agenda to commodify Abstract Expressionist paintings to make them 
powerful tools of international diplomacy. It is also important to remember, writes 
Solomon, “that though American commitment to American art had been well established 
for many years, foreign interest in American art escalated in the ‘50s and early ‘60s.”
88
 
The AIEP was a direct descendent of MoMA’s effort to push Abstract Expressionism 
abroad. President Kennedy had to establish the AIEP by executive order which was 
“made necessary by the congressional refusal to fund art for embassy walls.”
89
 Congress 
maintained its opposition to modern art as well as activities reflective of the International 
Council.  
 Following its creation, however, the AIEP was not enthusiastically embraced nor 
excused from criticism within the federal government. The incoherency of official 
opinion toward art diplomacy remained into the 1960s. The political environment the 
AIEP was founded in, states Douglas McCreary Greenwood writing on behalf of AIEP, 
was not much different from when the International Program and International Council 
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were founded: “Implications from the McCarthy era that contemporary art was either 
subversive or Communist-inspired, or both, lingered long into the Sixties.”
90
 President 
Nixon in a White House memo dated January 26, 1970 stated: “As you, of course, know 
those who are on the modern art and music kick are 95 percent against us anyway. I refer 
to the recent addicts of Leonard Bernstein and the whole New York crowd.”
91
 Another 
term for Abstract Expressionism in the 1950s was the “New York School” and it made 
New York City an art capital of the world. President Nixon had been involved in the 
national scene long enough to know this. He also added a post script to his memo which 
stated: “I also want a check made with regard to the incredibly atrocious modern art that 
has been scattered around the embassies around the world,” and concludes:  
We, of course, cannot tell the Ambassadors what kind of art they personally have, but I 
found in travelling around the world that many of our Ambassadors were displaying the 
modern art due to the fact that they were compelled to because of some committee which 
once was headed up by Mrs. Kefauver [a Democrat] and where they were loaned some of 
these little uglies from the Museum of Modern Art in New York. At least, I want a quiet 
check made—not one that is going to hit the newspapers and stir up all the troops—but I 
simply want it understood that this Administration is going to turn away from the policy 
of forcing our embassies abroad or those who receive assistance from the United States at 




If the AIEP was a direct extension of the efforts to push Abstract Expressionism and 
American art abroad, President Nixon represented an extension of the efforts to counter 
it, perhaps having more to do with his perceived political enemies than the art itself. 
More in depth research needs to be done to determine how effective the President’s 
request was at removing modern art from embassy walls, but one can surmise that the 
continuous efforts of the AIEP throughout his Administration are evidence he was not 
very successful. This was also likely true because not all the efforts to put art in 
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embassies were immediately transferred to the auspices of the State Department as 
MoMA and the Woodward Foundation continued their efforts.  
 While its exhibits enjoyed success from the beginning of its efforts, the AIEP was 
underfunded and understaffed necessitating the continued assistance of private efforts. 
An April 1966 press release from MoMA provides an update of its own Art in Embassies 
Project and also states: “Last year the State Department also began a program under the 
aegis of Mrs. Nancy Kefauver and has supplied art for 25 embassies. As there are 115 
embassies, and as the collections change as ambassadors change, all three agencies are 
fully occupied.”
93
 The third agency referenced here is the Woodward Foundation, a 
private initiative created to carry out similar activities as the International Council’s 
Project. The Foundation was much smaller than the Project but made generous loans 
from its own private collection of modern and contemporary art. 
 The activities of the AIEP were suddenly altered in November, 1967 with the 
unexpected death of Nancy Kefauver. Kefauver was attending a banquet at the White 
House on November 22 when she collapsed and later died at the age of 55 as the result of 
a stroke. In just over four years Kefauver brought the AIEP to life and curated exhibitions 
at politically strategic locations such as the U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen, Moscow, 
Kuala Lumpur, and New Delhi. The loss of Kefauver’s vigor essentially ceased AIEP 
exhibitions until her successor was named more than a year later. She had been thrust into 
a volatile contemporary art market and a contentious period of U.S. history, a situation 
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she had not been prepared for. Despite this Kefauver entered and maneuvered within the 
mid-century American avant-garde scene with confidence. Kefauver’s brief career as the 
Director of the AIEP was marked by her unique curatorial decisions which will be the 



































THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART: COLD WAR CONDUIT 
 
 
 A discussion of the ascension of Abstract Expressionism must be about the 
Museum of Modern Art as much as the artwork itself. The story of Abstract 
Expressionism is intertwined with MoMA at a fundamental level. Abstract 
Expressionism had the precedents for its reception as well as its position in American 
society deeply influenced through MoMA officials. They were able to do this through the 
network of prominent characters involved with the institution, their affiliations, and the 
exhibition schedule they planned for Abstract Expressionist artwork. The most prominent 
of these figures was Nelson Rockefeller. His ties to MoMA can be traced back to the 
institution’s inception as his mother Abby Aldrich Rockefeller was one of the co-
founders.  That Rockefeller served as the museum’s president throughout most of the 
1940s and 50s clearly shows the access he had to the institution. Abstract Expressionism 
was one of his keenest artistic interests within his personal collection, exceeding 2,500 
works in this style which he considered examples of “free enterprise painting.”
94
 The 
wartime exhibitions he planned as the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs for 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and while serving as President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s special advisor on Cold War strategy in 1954, and the briefings he received 
from CIA officials about covert cultural operations nearly certify that Rockefeller was 
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aware of government aims and activities.
95
 Considering his position as the president of 
MoMA, his influence on the International Council, and as a trustee of the Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund, Rockefeller “presided over some of the most influential minds of the 
period as they thrashed out definitions of American foreign policy.”
96
 
 One of these individuals was Tom Braden who was MoMA’s managing director
97
 
between 1947 and 1949. After Braden no longer worked at MoMA he became a CIA 
official closely linked to covert non-military aspects of the Cold War. Art was, for him, 
mainly a tool that could be controlled; in his view “progressive artists need an elite to 
subsidize them, the public is incapable of recognizing good art.”
98
 Patronage involved 
much more than supporting an artist or their art: Braden’s conception was that it “carried 
with it a duty to instruct, to educate people to accept not what they want, or think they 
want, but what they ought to have.”
99
 This desire to construct and maintain an elite 
establishment was evident in the agenda of another MoMA official.  
 William Burden’s involvement at MoMA spanned multiple decades. He joined 
the Advisory Committee in 1940, was appointed chairman of the Committee on Museum 
Collections in 1947, and in 1956 he became MoMA’s president. In his private life he was 
a highly successful venture capitalist and a descendent of “commodore” Vanderbilt. 
Burden “epitomized the Cold War establishment.”
100
 Men like Rockefeller, Braden, and 
Burden represented a presence of not only the establishment within MoMA, but a link to 
official government Cold War policy for culture.  
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 This link is pivotal for understanding how MoMA and the U.S. government 
sought to utilize modern art. MoMA and its International Council sought to publically 
appear to be functioning independently, but were actually operating as a nexus for Cold 
War cultural initiatives. The listed men and their colleagues created an ambiguous 
network of links to the private sector and federal agencies, namely the CIA and the State 
Department. Individuals operating at the top of MoMA’s hierarchy funneled and 
processed agendas meant to promulgate, through international exhibitions, the 
government’s idealistic vision of American culture. Rockefeller and his elitist colleagues 
influenced MoMA’s “big picture” agenda, but they also had to make that agenda manifest 
in the day-to-day operations. 
  These agendas were transformed into institutional initiatives and exhibitions by 
the leading members of MoMA’s staff who were cognizant of diplomatic ramifications. 
MoMA’s second director Rene d’Harnoncourt served as a liaison for Rockefeller and his 
committee members to implement their cultural diplomacy agenda. When d’Harnoncourt 
assumed the directorship in 1949 under Braden’s presidency, he became the custodian for 
access to MoMA’s influence and abilities as an institution. He not only controlled access 
to the physical and intellectual resources MoMA constituted, but openly sought support 
for initiatives in Congress. Believing that “modern art in its infinite variety and ceaseless 
exploration” was the “foremost symbol” of democracy, he lobbied Congress to support 
anti-Communist cultural campaigns.
101
 During those years he also reported to the State 
Department. Before d’Harnoncourt became director, his predecessor, Barr, had labored in 
a concerted campaign within the arts community to promote Abstract Expressionism as a 
unique and original American style.  
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 Alfred Barr served as the first director of MoMA from 1929 to 1943. Abby 
Aldrich Rockefeller invited Barr to the directorship where he would cultivate Abstract 
Expressionism from an institutional position. Barr utilized tactical precision and cunning 
to achieve his goals for promoting modern art. The significance of Abstract 
Expressionism was evident to him early on in his directorship but he was not blind to the 
opposition toward it. In a tactful, if not outright deceptive, manner he relied on a “two-
pronged” approach whereby he scheduled exhibitions of romantic or representational 
artwork to appease prevailing tastes.
102
 This allowed him to simultaneously acquire 
Abstract Expressionist paintings and subtly garner support for such works.
103
 
 Out of this web of individuals and institutional affiliations, MoMA played a 
prominent role in establishing Abstract Expressionism as the dominant and original 
American style. The extent and impact of that influence, however, is a point of contention 
among art historians including Eva Cockcroft, Michael Kimmelman, Frances Stonor 
Saunders, and David Craven. One contested issue in this vast scholarship is the analysis 
of Abstract Expressionism’s relationship with the federal government as an instrument of 
diplomacy. Among these scholars a main point of debate is the extent and thoroughness 
to which MoMA acted as an agent for the federal government in utilizing Abstract 
Expressionism as a diplomatic “weapon.”  
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 Eva Cockcroft wrote one of the earliest and most effective essays analyzing 
MoMA’s involvement. In “Abstract Expressionism: Weapon of the Cold War,” 
Cockcroft argues that MoMA promulgated Abstract Expressionism for political ends:  
Links between cultural cold war politics and the success of Abstract Expressionism are 
by no means coincidental, or unnoticeable. They were consciously forged at the time by 
some of the most influential figures controlling museum policies and advocating 




Cockcroft highlights the International Program and International Council as “major 
supporters” of Abstract Expressionism through their use of it as an implement of Cold 
War diplomacy. MoMA did not push Abstract Expressionism abroad as part of 
international diplomacy for purely patriotic reasons: the Museum tried to establish its 
own dominance within the international and domestic art community. Figures such as 
Rockefeller, Braden, d’Harnoncourt, and Barr are dissected to show how they functioned 
as agents of cultural diplomacy for the CIA. Modern art exhibitions produced by the 
International Program consisting primarily of Abstract Expressionist artworks were sent 
to international exhibitions in London, São Paulo, Paris, and Tokyo. Cockcroft highlights 
how most other nations’ artworks at such exhibitions were government-sponsored, 
lending the International Program a “quasi-official character” by association.
105
 MoMA 
had to sponsor these exhibitions due to limitations placed on the CIA and State 
Department by Congress. As a private non-profit organization, the Museum was free to 
put on such exhibitions extoling life and benefits under capitalism. Because the Museum 
was “freed from the kinds of pressure of unsubtle red-baiting and super-jingoism applied 
to official governmental agencies” it could push federal cultural agendas in a subtler, 
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 Cockcroft clearly establishes the intricate web of 
relationships and interests existing between MoMA and the CIA during the McCarthy 
years.  
 Following Cockcroft’s condemning essay a number of art historians reasserted her 
argument from the later 1970s through the early 1990s. Eventually, however, MoMA 
mounted a counterattack to her accusations. Art critic Kimmelman, writing for MoMA in 
its publication The Museum of Modern Art at Mid-Century: At Home and Abroad, 
attempted to use statistical data to debunk Cockcroft and her affiliates. He also attempted 
to demonstrate that MoMA’s critics were a product of their historical context.  
 Kimmelman writes with feigned authority to undermine Cockcroft and her fellow 
critics. He attempts to debunk them based on their own context: “Context is essential to 
revisionist historians and critics. And their critique of the Modern has a context as well. 
Namely the late 1960s and early 1970s, the era of the Vietnam War and domestic social 
upheaval.”
107
 He references such happenings as the covert bombing of Laos and the 
Watergate scandal, which spurred widespread distrust of government and those affiliated 
with it. Kimmelman attempts to equate Cockcroft’s critical art history with the anti-
establishment sentiments of the era, as opposed to the very established nature of MoMA 
by this time. 
 Beyond their historical context Kimmelman anatomizes Cockcroft’s statistical 
data and reading of that data. Kimmelman writes: 
The Modern did not, as Cockroft [sic]
108
 contended, take sole responsibility for the U.S. 
representation at the Biennales from 1954 through 1962: It ceded that task twice—to The 
Art Institute of Chicago (in 1956) and to The Baltimore Museum of Art (1960). As for 
the Sao Paulo Bienal, the Modern put together only three of the U.S. exhibitions between 
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1953 and 1965 (in 1953, 1957, and 1961); others were organized by the San Francisco 
Museum of Modern Art (1955), the Walker Art Center (1963), the Minneapolis Institute 




According to Kimmelman, not only are portions of Cockcrofts data incorrect, but also her 
interpretation of correct data are flawed. Writing about Cockcroft’s analysis of MoMA’s 
exhibition of 1955-56 “Modern Art in the United States,” Kimmelman asserts: 
Cockroft claimed [“Modern Art in the United States”] included a dozen Abstract 
Expressionists, had works by 112 artists in all.  
 How is one to judge the meaning of such statistics, in any case? Is the number of 
participants or pictures a reliable guide to the character of an exhibition? What about the 
placement and size of the pictures? What about the language of the exhibition’s 
promotional and educational materials? What about the extent to which the art may, or 
may not, have been selected and analyzed in ways indebted to Abstract Expressionist 
values? 
 One needs to know more about the big survey of 112 artists organized by 
Dorothy Miller, for example, which Cockroft cited. Did the Abstract Expressionists 
culminate a chronological progression, or did they constitute a critical mass that 




Kimmelman takes a strategically astute approach by calling attention to such curatorial 
aspects as gallery layout and educational material. An exhibition cannot be judged solely 
by the artwork included, but the curators have a significant impact through their myriad 
choices in how to exhibit those works, an aspect Cockcroft neglects.  
 Kimmelman does not deny a link between MoMA and Abstract Expressionism 
existed but he argues that relationship had been sensationalized. MoMA sent numerous 
exhibitions containing Abstract Expressionist works abroad, but Kimmelman argues 
MoMA was not always the initiator of the efforts. Referencing a 1956 exhibition held in 
Europe, Kimmelman writes: “D’Harnoncourt’s foreword to the American catalogue 




                                                          
109
 Kimmelman, “Revisiting the revisionists,” 45.  
110
 Kimmelman, “Revisiting the revisionists,” 45.  
111





 The evidence all points, for Kimmelman, away from MoMA. Acquisitions and 
exhibition rosters demonstrate how critics of MoMA over-assert superficial links between 
anti-Communist cultural programs and the Museum’s embrace of Abstract 
Expressionism. Kimmelman, however, overstates his own argument when he declares: 
“In fact, the Modern would seem to have been slow to take up Abstract Expressionism’s 
cause. Its circulating shows stressed European masters, as did shows at the Museum.”
112
 
Kimmelman ultimately concedes that Cockcroft and her affiliates were not fundamentally 
wrong in arguing MoMA embraced Abstract Expressionism, but he claims their argument 
was sensationalized and ascribed non-existent intent. The proliferation of Abstract 
Expressionism was certainly encouraged by MoMA, but Kimmelman argues that 
relationship was not as concrete or purposeful as Cockcroft and her affiliates profess. The 
“statistical and historical assumptions” they make, according to Kimmelman, do not align 
with the evidence.
113
 Kimmelman’s assessment of Cockcroft’s argument would seem to 
undermine her analysis, his own analysis, however, also has significant flaws.  
 Five years after Kimmelman’s essay appeared in a MoMA publication, Frances 
Stonor Saunders published a book focusing on the use of culture as a diplomatic tool in 
the United States during the Cold War. In her chaptered titled “Yanqui Doodles” 
Saunders analyzes the triangular relationship between MoMA, the CIA, and Abstract 
Expressionism. Acknowledging the manifold ties and cultural influence between MoMA 
officials and the CIA, Saunders does not find their relationship startling, but rather self-
evident of mid-century Cold War America. The social and sometimes official links of this 
relationship are not enough to definitively prove a conspiracy between MoMA and the 
                                                          
112
 Kimmelman, “Revisiting the revisionists,” 50. 
113





CIA to advance Abstract Expressionism. Those links, however, are numerous and 
intertwined forming a comfortable network that demonstrates some level of official 
connection between MoMA and the federal government.
114
 While the relationships and 
ties Cockcroft and fellow revisionist art historians cite form a supposition, the amount of 
evidence makes it difficult, if not impossible, to undermine their argument.  
 Saunders shifts her focus to Kimmelman and MoMA’s defenders. In a single 
paragraph, Saunders is able to undermine his argument:  
MoMA’s defenders have consistently attacked the claim that the museum’s support of 
Abstract Expressionism was in any way linked to the covert advancement of America’s 
international image. Curiously, one argument they use is that MoMA actually neglected 
the movement when it first emerged. ‘The Modern’s exhibitions of Abstract 
Expressionism, more so at home, but also abroad, came on the whole only during the 
later fifties, by which time the movement’s first generation had already been followed by 
a second,’ wrote Michael Kimmelman, in a rebuttal commissioned by MoMA. To argue 
that MoMA simply missed what was right under its nose is disingenuous, and ignores the 
fact that the museum had steadily and consistently collected works by the Abstract 
Expressionists from the time of their earliest appearance. From 1941, MoMA acquired 
works by Arshile Gorky, Alexander Calder, Frank Stella, Robert Motherwell, Jackson 
Pollock, Stuart Davis and Adolph Gottlieb. In May 1944, the museum sold at auction 
‘certain of its nineteenth century works of art to provide funds for the purchase of 
twentieth century works.’ Although receipts from the sale were disappointing, enough 
cash was made available to purchase ‘important paintings by Pollock, Motherwell, and 
Matta.’ Thus, as might be expected of a museum of modern art, and particularly one 
which acknowledged that it held ‘a tremendous moral responsibility toward living artists 
whose careers and fortunes can be drastically affected by the Museum’s support or lack 




Saunders continues, demonstrating Kimmelman is not only mistaken about the 
relationship of MoMA and Abstract Expressionism, but also uses other examples to show 
intent:  
The Museum of Modern Art was neither free from propaganda, nor from government 
figures. When, for example, it accepted the contract to supply the art exhibit for the 
Congress for Cultural Freedom’s 1952 Masterpieces festival in Paris, it did so under the 
auspices of trustees who were fully cognizant of the CIA’s role in that organization. 
Moreover, the exhibit’s curator, James Johnson Sweeney (a member of MoMA’s 
advisory committee, and of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom), publicly 
endorsed the propaganda value of the show when he announced: ‘On display will be 
masterpieces that could not have been created nor whose exhibition would be allowed by 
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A litany of other examples is provided to further demonstrate the point that MoMA was 
acting at the very least in line with, if not at the behest of, government officials and 
agendas. Previous art historians focused on the actions (or proposed inactions) of MoMA 
and the level of involvement and influence of the federal government.  
 In 1999, the same year Saunders published her book, Craven also published a 
study of Abstract Expressionism and its role as a weapon of the Cold War. Craven 
utilizes unpublished correspondence and documents, recently declassified FBI files, and 
personal interviews to formulate a fresh perspective of Abstract Expressionism in the 
1950s and 1960s. In his book Abstract Expressionism as Cultural Critique: Dissent 
During the McCarthy Period, Craven reestablishes the position and relationship of 
Abstract Expressionist art and artists to the culture, society, and government of the 
United States. “The anti-movement known as Abstract Expressionism,” Craven asserts, 




 Craven does not argue that past art historians are wrong, but rather they did not 
see the entire picture and exaggerated their claims. “There has been considerable 
exaggeration by art historians on both the Right and the Left,” Craven writes: 
about the degree of success enjoyed by the CIA and cold-war liberals in remaking 
Abstract Expressionism into a mere celebratory signified of late capitalism along with 
U.S. hegemony. This situation remains the case in spite of the way many mainstream art 
historians, along with their adversaries among the social historians of art, unhesitatingly 
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Past art historical studies are not, however, rendered useless in Craven’s view: “The point 
here is not so much that they [Cockcroft and affiliates] are wrong, but that their positions 
are now too reductive (and dated) to permit further insights into the ongoing struggle over 




 Past art historical essays, such as Cockcroft’s, embody a pivotal step for Craven 
to arrive at his analysis. Craven argues that revisionist art historians, however, have also 
exhausted their influence. Craven describes Cockcroft’s and similar art historian’s 
contributions:  
In her well-known 1974 study…Eva Cockcroft outlined in groundbreaking fashion the 
nexus of relationships involving former CIA operatives and some MOMA officials 
whereby Abstract Expressionism, along with other U.S. artworks in many different 
styles, was exhibited abroad as ‘representative’ of U.S. culture. Hence, it is in this 
qualified sense that Serge Guilbaut [arguing in line with Cockcroft] was justified in his 
claim that North American ‘Avant-garde radicalism did not really ‘sell out,’ it was 




Craven’s analysis is built on the foundation established by Cockcroft and revisionist art 
historians. Their influence has been exhausted, along with other historians such as 
Kimmelman, however, because of their focus on the affiliations between MoMA, critics, 
and government agencies. They assume reactions and signification of Abstract 
Expressionism for entire nations. Craven asserts his analysis is more accurate because he 
goes outside this scope to explore local reactions to Abstract Expressionism beyond 
Europe and the United States as well as his in-depth research into the affiliations and 
sentiments among the artists.
121
 By including more perspectives Craven argues the artists 
acted with more independence that previously perceived. The core of his argument, 
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however, is focused on detailing how Abstract Expressionism was utilized as a 
commodity:  
Indeed, it was the paradoxical and quite unsettled context of the 1950s that, in addition to 
cold-war hysteria, allowed people allied with the U.S. government and corporate capital 
to attempt to use—often rather unsuccessfully—both modernist art and social realism as 
signifiers of an existing state of ‘total freedom’ in the United States. This occurred when 
people formerly of the CIA, in collusion with certain cold-war liberals of corporate 
capital, mounted clandestine support for circulating exhibitions of artworks by dissident 
figurative artists, such as Ben Shahn, on the one hand, and the Abstract Expressionists, on 
the other. Revealingly, covert involvement by people associated with the CIA in funding 
these exhibitions was necessary because of the overt government censorship of the arts 




MoMA was a necessary surrogate for government utilization of Abstract Expressionism 
in diplomacy. Only by commodifying the artwork could it be made to “represent” mid-
century capitalist American culture. A more detailed analysis of Craven’s argument and 
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SEEKING AN INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE 
 
 
 In spite of assertions regarding MoMA’s utilization of Abstract Expressionism, 
the artists never fully embraced the role placed on them. Critical success, riches, and 
fame quickly came to original members of the New York School; especially its leading 
members such as Pollock and Rothko. Despite their success, Pollock died in an 
automobile accident due to alcohol, and Rothko committed suicide in his studio because, 
according to his close friends, he could not “cope with the contradiction of being 
showered with material rewards for works which ‘howled their opposition to burgeoi 
[sic] materialism.’”
123
 Saunders asserts that no matter the extent to which Abstract 
Expressionist art was utilized as a political tool it cannot be reduced to that. She argues 
that “Abstract Expressionism, like jazz, was—is—a creative phenomenon existing 
independently and even, yes, triumphantly, apart from the political use which was made 
of it.”
124
 Saunders is one of the few art historians to consider the relationship of MoMA, 
the federal government, and Abstract Expressionism from the perspective of the artists 
and their artwork. 
 In contrast to past, or even current, understandings of Abstract Expressionism, it 
was never completely successfully utilized as a diplomatic tool for the U.S. government. 
Craven argues this from a previously neglected point of view. It was not due to the 
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failings of MoMA or government officials, but the ability of Abstract Expressionist art 
and artists to elude their agenda, labels, and dialectic. This dialectic is concisely captured 
by Gibson when she characterizes the artists given choices as being between 
“Communism and McCarthyism,”
125
 of which there was realistically only one choice. 
Craven writes, “The New York School preferred the term ‘anti-Stalinist’ to define their 
political beliefs. It allowed them, in essence, to be communist but not ‘Red’ communism, 
this defied the accepted polarity of the period.”
126
 Abstract expressionism never signified 
or embodied what diplomatically minded individuals assumed and presented it to be. It 
was the equivalent of using a jackhammer to force a round peg into a square opening. 
When Abstract Expressionism was presented as “American” art abroad, it was not 
universally accepted as such. While it was made in the U.S., it cannot be accurately 
equated with mid-century “Americaness.” Craven describes this situation: “This artwork 
is a ‘national’ signifier abroad for a nation that has not generally embraced it and the 
‘international’ signifier elsewhere for a principled opposition to the nation that originally 
produced it.”
127
 One could argue then, that because anti-American art was produced in 
the U.S., it does serve its purpose as a signifier of freedom. The Abstract Expressionists, 
however, sought to protest the most basic assumptions of American society, including the 
confines of the “freedom” it was being utilized to signify.  
 The Abstract Expressionists contested the utopian consumerist U.S. society. 
Craven argues Abstract Expressionism was beyond the kind of protest ascribed to it by 
agents of diplomacy. He writes: “the emphatic nature of this undertaking [Abstract 
Expressionism] was not defined either as ‘escapism,’ ‘disengagement,’ ‘resignation,’ or 
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‘evasion,’ but rather as an ethically unrepentant and even desublimated contestation of 
the existing order.”
128
 The very nature of the “freedom” advertised by diplomatic officials 
was criticized by the Abstract Expressionists. That “freedom” was predicated on the 
individual’s right to choose, but those choices were only valid, according to American 
consumer culture, when they are made within the American market. It is evident that 
among the Abstract Expressionists there was a keen awareness of the failure of McCarthy 
era politics in the U.S. Their sense of alienation was manifested in the 1960s when 
members of the New York School “chose to support the civil rights movement, the 
antiwar movement, and the call for dramatic structural change in the 1960s.”
129
  
 Those individuals characterized as Abstract Expressionists wanted to operate 
independent of and criticize the consumerist structure imposed on American society. 
Gibson argues in her book Abstract Expressionism: Other Politics that the Abstract 
Expressionists were foremost dedicated to their artwork and repressing “anything that 
threatened the autonomy of art.”
130
 Proponents of mid-century commodified society 
attempted to soak up anything “produced” in the U.S. as a signifier of America’s 
superiority. A fundamental tactic the Abstract Expressionists utilized to repress this was 
the aesthetic emptiness of their paintings which eliminated any links with the 
interpretation or distribution of the artwork.
131
 Willem de Kooning affirms this when he 
argued that Abstract Expressionism “implies that every artist can do what he thinks he 
ought to—a movement for each person and open for everybody…It is exactly in its 
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uselessness that it is free.”
132
 This was not, however, a passive desire on the part of the 
Abstract Expressionists to be independent of consumerist culture. Gibson writes: “What 
they [Abstract Expressionists] consciously feared were those aspects of culture that 
marked their work as things for sale and those that regarded art as a vehicle for 
politics.”
133
 The artists characterized as being part of the Abstract Expressionist 
movement not only feared how their art would be manipulated by the society they lived, 
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COMMODIFYING ABSTRACT EXPRESSIONISM 
 
 
 The theory of Abstract Expressionism utilized for diplomacy was invented by 
critics and individuals in the private sector. These actors not only framed Abstract 
Expressionism as a product of American capitalism, but also promoted its proliferation. 
Towards this end individuals in the media were pressured to promote Abstract 
Expressionist artists.  
 Barr convinced Life magazine to feature Pollock, thereby introducing Abstract 
Expressionism to the audiences outside New York. When Pollock was featured in the 
August 1949 issue of Life it marked his, and Abstract Expressionism’s, definitive 
establishment on the national scene. Life magazine’s publisher and editor, Henry Luce, 
however, did not publish the story based solely on Pollock’s artistic merits. As the 
Director of Museum Collections at MoMA in 1949, Barr wrote to Luce convincing him 
not to criticize modern art as was being done in the Soviet Union. “Thus was Luce,” 
writes Saunders, “who held the phrase ‘America’s intellectual health’ permanently on the 
end of his tongue…won over to Barr’s and MoMA’s interests.”
134
 The August, 1949 
issue of Life allowed Abstract Expressionism to enter homes across the country. It was 
not, however, about artwork but rather a personal profile of Pollock. Such exposes helped 
build the artist’s celebrity status, aiding in commodifying his artwork as manifestations of 
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his fame. This not only played into MoMA’s agenda but also formed the basis for how 
Kefauver would make critical selections from the art market for the AIEP.  
 Abstract Expressionism was exposed to new audiences through the media as well 
as critical literature, but that exposure strategically neglected the artist’s critical beliefs. 
Critics attempted to isolate Abstract Expressionism from the artist’s politics by focusing 
on the artwork’s formal aspects. One of the most significant figures to mold a framework 
for Abstract Expressionism was Clement Greenberg who stated: “These American 
painters did not set out to be advanced. They set out to paint good pictures.”
135
 Greenberg 
was the central figure among art critics who emphasized a purely formalist reading of 
Abstract Expressionism. Formalism is defined by the Encyclopedia of Aesthetics as “the 
aesthetic doctrine in which…related (formal) elements are said to be the primary locus of 
aesthetic value, a value that is independent of such other characteristics of an artwork as 
meaning, reference, or utility.”
136
 Craven states in his analysis that Abstract 
Expressionism “was unjustifiably bowdlerized in ideological terms by one of its 
‘defenders’ (i.e. Greenberg), who thereby cleared the way for a formalist dogma of 
modernism that was narrow-mindedly presumed to follow.”
137
  
 Greenberg’s analysis reduced Abstract Expressionist paintings to “art for art’s 
sake.” This theory ignored the diverse political agendas of Abstract Expressionist artists. 
Greenberg, along with MoMA, propagated this conception of Abstract Expressionism 
through:  
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the institutionally mediated reception of these paintings, which increasingly encourages 
the fetishistic view of them as the most costly human-made objects in the world, could 
lead to the appropriation or evisceration of both the critical edge and aesthetic import of 




Through the exhibition then  buying and selling of Abstract Expressionists’ artwork, their 
paintings were relegated to commodities isolated from the artists’ politics rendering them 
unopposed to 1950s capitalist America. Saunders asserts MoMA “held tenaciously to its 
executive role in manufacturing a history for Abstract Expressionism”:  
Ordered and systematic, this history reduced what had once been provocative and strange 
to an academic formula, a received mannerism, an art official. Thus installed within the 
canon, the freest form of art now lacked freedom. More and more painters produced more 
and more paintings which got bigger and bigger and emptier and emptier. It was this very 
stylistic conformity, prescribed by MoMA and the broader social contract of which it was 
a part, that brought Abstract Expressionism to the verge of kitsch. ‘It was like the 
emperor’s clothes,’ said Jason Epstein. ‘You parade it down the street and you say, “This 
is great art,” and the people along the parade route will agree with you. Who’s going to 
stand up to Clem[ent] Greenberg and later to the Rockefellers who were buying it for 




By featuring Abstract Expressionism as the greatest artistic creations of American 
democracy based on capitalism, MoMA ensured it would also be the most valuable. The 
commodification of Abstract Expressionism was paralleled by rising financial incentives 
to paint and competition in the market. By the end of the 1950s Pop art emerged, 
critically engaging the art market commodifying Abstract Expressionism as well as 
commodified society.  
 Throughout the 1950s, however, Abstract Expressionist artwork and artists 
resisted commodification. Greenberg and MoMA failed to fully encapsulate Abstract 
Expressionist painting as a commodity. “The paintings of Abstract Expressionism,” 
writes Craven: 
which arose partly as an assimilation of non-Western cultural traditions and as a 
repudiation of commodity production in the United States—would indeed sometimes 
become quite precious commodities exalting the American Way; yet they would also 
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remain many other, often contradictory, things as well, at least some of which rendered 
this process of commodification fundamentally unstable and never entirely uncontested. 
(It is of note here that formalist critics such as Clement Greenberg, ever concerned with 
bowdlerizing this art and blunting its critical edge, would celebrate in 1960 how “The 




Attempts to commoditize Abstract Expressionist art succeeded to an extent, but the 
artwork was never fully isolated from its critical nature. The attempts to relegate Abstract 
Expressionism to “art for art’s sake” failed because a purely formalist analysis of the 
artwork ignores the nature of its creation. Robert Motherwell retorted to such efforts: “I 
believe that the New York School, like Surrealism, is less an aesthetic style…than a state 
of mind…And a mode of life.”
141
 This “mode of life”, however, was incompatible with 
the utopian capitalist America represented in international diplomacy. 
 MoMA’s curatorial decisions during the 1950s reflect the agenda to repress non-
formalist aspects of Abstract Expressionism. In 1953 MoMA organized an exhibition of 
what it designated as the best American avant-garde art titled 12 Modern American 
Painters and Sculptors.
142
 The exhibition was held at the Musée National d'Art Modern 
and had tumultuous beginnings. MoMA claimed the request for the exhibition came from 
the host institution to pre-emptively counter claims it was pushing American art on 
France. This was, however, not true. A dispatch from the American Embassy in Paris 
recounts how  
In early February 1953, the Museum requested the Cultural Relations Section of the 
Embassy to discuss with Jean Cassou, Director of the Musee National d’Art Moderne at 
Paris, the possibility of putting on the present show. M. Cassou had already scheduled all 
of his exhibition space until the spring of 1954. On learning, however, that this exhibition 
would be available, he reorganized his plans and put off an exhibition of the Belgian 
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The Embassy was unable “to take any action on this request because of the absence of 
any art program under the auspices of the United States Government,” but that “in the 
case of the exhibition of American art under consideration, however, the Nelson 
Rockefeller Fund broke this deadlock, which allotted funds to the Museum of Modern 
Art in New York to be used for international exhibitions.”
144
 Since the Embassy was 
unable to officially support an exhibition of critical avant-garde art, it coordinated with 
the Association Française d’Action Artistique to garner support. A donation from the 
Association provided funds for a catalog, posters, and “all publicity for the show.”
145
 
 With official links to MoMA and the CIA it is evident the Association was not 
simply acting in the name of art. The director of the Association, Phillipe Erlanger, had 
organized support for the U.S. based Congress for Cultural Freedom and he was also a 
designated CIA contact in the French Foreign Office. According to Saunders, “Through 
him, the Congress for Cultural Freedom (and on this occasion, MoMA), acquired a 
credible conduit for official French funds to cultural propaganda initiatives.”
146
 It was 
through such covert dealings that MoMA and the Rockefellers devised exhibition 
schedules of Abstract Expressionism.  
 The curatorial decisions of the exhibitions reveal a specific diplomatic agenda. 
The diversity of artwork included in the exhibition is telling of what MoMA wanted the 
artwork to signify. As Craven describes, there was an “attempt [emphasis added] to use—
often rather unsuccessfully—both modernist and social realism as signifiers of an 
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existing state of ‘total freedom’ in the United States.”
147
 As Figure 1
148
 depicts, the 
exhibition ranged in scope from John Kane to Pollock. As the title to the exhibition 
demonstrates, the most fundamental theme is simply that the artwork was American. 
MoMA disregards Abstract Expressionism’s desire to isolate itself from mid-century 
capitalist America as well as social realism’s critique of that culture.  
 Analyzing Figure 1 also reveals further curatorial initiatives. At the far end of the 
gallery is Pollock’s characteristic drip painting. While it is partially blocked by an 
Alexander Calder mobile and sculpture, it is the climax at the end of the gallery and 
would draw visitors to the final gallery as they ventured through. From Figure 1 and 
Figure 2,
149
 one can ascertain the final gallery is also the largest. The Pollock, although 
the largest, is given preferential wall space independent of any other works. There is clear 
favoritism toward Abstract Expressionist works in this exhibition even though all the 
artwork is presented as “American.” 
 In 1958 the International Council sponsored another exhibition of avant-garde 
American art. The New American Painting
150
 was intended to be a “who’s who” among 
Modern American artists with the press release declaring it is the “first comprehensive 
exhibition to be sent to Europe of advanced tendencies in American painting.”
151
 MoMA 
attempted to keep its diplomatic agenda covert by stating:  
Although these artists have been associated with the movement generally called Abstract  
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Figure 2. “Installation view of 12 Modern American Painters and Sculptors,” Musee 


























Figure 3. “Rene d’Harnoncourt (right) at the press opening of ’12 Modern American 










Expressionism, according to Alfred H. Barr, Jr,, Director of Museum Collections, who 
has written the introduction for the exhibition catalog, they dislike labels and shun the 
words “movement” and “school.” ‘None speaks for the others any more than he paints for 
the others. Their individualism is uncompromising and as a matter of principle they do 




Claiming Abstract Expressionism is not a “movement” caters to MoMA’s 
commodification of it. Barr argues the artists paint independently, negating suspicion of a 
“movement” with an agenda. He also focuses on the formalist aspects of the paintings, 
which do not “make ‘communication’ easy,” further isolating them from politics. 
Claiming there was no collaboration between artists was also inaccurate. The term 
“School of New York” was coined by Motherwell in 1949
153
 to describe the growing 
movement and the publication Dissent demonstrates just one example of collaborative 
efforts.  
 When Barr apathetically argues how grouping these artists as “Abstract 
Expressionists” is inappropriate, he furtively directs attention to Abstract Expressionism. 
This falsely apathetic approach to Abstract Expressionism is further asserted in the press 
release which states the exhibition was organized “in response to numerous requests by 
the Museum’s International Program” motivated to “organize [the exhibition] in response 
to repeated requests from institutions in Europe.”
154
 Barr also maintains a formalist 
analysis by stating: “The paintings themselves have a sensuous, emotional, esthetic and at 
times mystical power which works and can be overwhelming.”
155
 The combination of 
diffusing Abstract Expressionism and employing formalist analysis to remove the 
paintings’ critical edge rendered the artwork as an inimitable diplomatic tool.  
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THE AIEP: CURATING COMMODITIES 
 
 
 While the roots of the AIEP are in MoMA’s International Council and 
International Program, the election of President Kennedy in 1960 was necessary to make 
it a federal program. During his campaign Kennedy outlined his ideas for the relationship 
between the government and the arts. In a campaign speech delivered in 1960, Kennedy 
said, “There is a connection, hard to explain logically but easy to feel, between 
achievement in public life and progress in the arts”:  
The age of Pericles was also the age of Phidias. The age of Lorenzo de Medici was also 
the age of Leonardo da Vinci. The age of Elizabeth also the age of Shakespeare. And the 
New Frontier for which I campaign in public life, can also be a New Frontier for 
American Art. 
 For what I descry is a lift for our country; a surge of economic growth; a burst of 
activity in rebuilding and cleansing our cities; a breakthrough of the barriers of racial and 
religious discrimination; an Age of Discovery in science and space; and an openness 
toward what is new that will banish the suspicion and misgiving that have tarnished our 
prestige abroad. I forsee[sic], in short, an America that is moving once again.  
 And in harmony with that creative bust, there is bound to come the New Frontier 
in the Arts. For we stand, I believe, on the verge of a period of sustained cultural 
brilliance.156 
 
Kennedy equates economic growth with artistic creativity and asserts a paternalistic 
relationship of the former over the latter. According to Kennedy, Pericles and Lorenzo de 
Medici, for example, created societies which allowed and fostered the flourishing of the 
arts. Kennedy recognized and accepted the theory put forth by Barr that American art was 
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a product of American capitalism. Diplomatic activities involving the arts, therefore, 
were attractive to his administration. 
 In 1963 President Kennedy appointed August Heckscher to conduct a study on the 
federal government and the arts. The report submitted to President Kennedy on May 28, 
1963 discusses a vast range of arts activities with one section devoted to placing 
American artwork in embassies abroad. Heckscher details the necessity of an art in 
embassies program and says of the artwork: “these works should not be considered 
‘interior decoration,’ but as art representing the finest of American creative 
expression.”157 Heckscher reaffirms the notion of linking patriotism and artistic 
achievement. While subtle, this notion is representative of official opinion and pervaded 
the AIEP. 
 The AIEP’s stated purpose and criteria for artwork reflect an assumed 
“Americaness” for artwork produced in the United States. The AIEP outlines its activities 
and states: “The Art in the Embassies Program is a service of the Department of State, the 
purpose being to provide art appropriate for the representational rooms of Ambassador’s 
Residences and Chanceries.”158 This is the closest definition of a mission statement to be 
found for the AIEP and does not demonstrate a commitment to the artwork. 
“Appropriate” art that is “representational” of the United States defines the filter through 
which artwork will be presented to foreign audiences.159 The criteria laid out by the AIEP 
reaffirm this agenda:  
We believe that: 
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1. Works of art must be original.  
2. All must be of recognized quality to best represent American culture.  
3. Important factors in planning a collection are the cultural concepts and art trends of the 
country in which the works are to be placed.  
4. For Embassy Residence, preference of the Ambassador and his wife should be 
considered and related to established criteria.  
5. To insure conservation of the art, climatic conditions must be taken into account.160 
 
Abstract Expressionism and Pop art did not “best represent American culture.”  Rather, 
mid-century American avant-garde artwork was made appropriate through 
commodification.  
 The AIEP misrepresented Abstract Expressionist and Pop art work by showcasing 
them as commodities in its exhibitions. Catalogs produced in conjunction with AIEP 
exhibition reveal how the artwork was misrepresented. The majority of catalogs produced 
for AIEP exhibitions in the 1960s had universal introductory essays. On occasion, a brief 
section or additional paragraph would explain something of the artwork or artists, but 
rarely, if ever, place them in a critical theory. The catalog produced for the exhibition Art 
in Embassies on Display at the American Embassy Club states: “The program is designed to 
further the appreciation of American creative ability abroad by providing U.S. embassies 
throughout the world with good original art reflecting current and traditional North 
American culture in an effective manner.”161 The catalog also states that “All artworks 
displayed are originals and all are of recognized quality to best represent American 
culture.”162  
 Artwork was selected and filtered to best represent an idealized American culture, 
not to demonstrate the best representations of American culture. The focus of AIEP 
exhibitions was not to highlight significant examples of United States culture, but to 
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display the vitality of a utopian capitalist vision of America. In this particular catalog 
there are seven paragraphs explaining the AIEP and its significance for the federal 
government, and one paragraph pertaining to the artwork itself. It states: “from the 
collection which the American Embassy in Bonn has received in the framework of this 
program 22 works are being shown here. They include original prints of living American 
artists, representing all trends. Modern realism and abstract expressionism are included as 
are OP and POP art.”163 This is reminiscent of MoMA’s 1953 exhibition 12 American 
Painters and Sculptors where social realism and Abstract Expressionism were 
unsuccessfully exhibited together simply as American works of art.164 The AIEP makes 
no effort to differentiate Abstract Expressionism and Pop art, their significance lies in 
their “Americaness.” This is typical for catalogs produced by the AIEP during the 1960s. 
A litany of the styles included or how the collection came into existence form the 
standard content. “In-depth” discussion of the artwork and its theoretical basis is 
practically non-existent. This statement, like most, is a rather feeble attempt to place the 
artwork in a context. Devotion is paid to the AIEP and the “Americaness” of the artwork 
rather than the artistic contributions of the art or artists.  
 The statement “to best represent American culture” was exceptionally 
problematic when considered in this context. Given the selection of artwork included in 
exhibitions, if the AIEP had made a conscious recognition of the volatility and ever 
present change in the U.S. during the 1960s their exhibitions could have verged on 
brilliant. There was no recognition of this, however, and exhibitions were only 
conglomerations of what the AIEP perceived as popular in the art market. This is 
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demonstrative of how the AIEP’s curatorial decisions were a direct extension of MoMA’s 
promulgation of Abstract Expressionism abroad. MoMA exhibited Abstract 
Expressionism as the best artistic commodity being produced in the U.S. The AIEP 
continued this practice by selecting popular artwork from the market and making no 
attempt to maintain its context. The only context reflected in curatorial decisions was the 
artworks being produced in America and sold in its leading commercial galleries and 
collected by its major museums.  
 The leadership of the AIEP demonstrated awareness of the vitality and diversity 
of mid-century American avant-garde art but failed to understand and incorporate its 
tenants into exhibitions. “To the connoisseurs, abstract represents the artists thinking” 
stated Kefauver, “It represents the turmoil of these times… Representational art is found 
in pop art…which is very documentary, and in both comic strips and advertising 
art…This art typifies our way of life [emphasis added].”165 Kefauver was aware of the art 
market’s diversity, but she was reluctant to classify the artwork beyond being American. 
This statement is likely referring to three Pop artists that appeared in AIEP exhibitions: 
Roy Lichtenstein, Andy Warhol, and Robert Rauschenberg. Kefauver was likely 
referencing Warhol and Rauschenberg when she spoke of “advertising art,” further 
evidenced by their inclusion in a number of AIEP exhibitions in the mid-1960s. It is a 
near certainty she was referencing Lichtenstein when she spoke of “comic strip” art. 
While their artwork utilized representational signifiers of American culture, it was 
certainly not in a manner that “typifies” the culture.  
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 Warhol’s artwork was proclaimed to represent America around the world. A 
Newsweek expose states: “Andy Warhol’s ‘Flowers’ bloom on walls in American 
chanceries in Nepal, Bern, and the American Embassy in Madrid.”166 The New York 
Times also heralded that “When Ambassador and Mrs. Angier Biddle Duke took up their 
new post recently in Madrid, they adorned the walls of their embassy residence with a 
painting by Andy Warhol, the pop artist.”167 In both instances the AIEP provided the 
artwork. These statements did not come from the AIEP but they were no doubt endorsed. 
Once again, the AIEP had arbitrarily drawn a parallel between an American artist and 
“Americaness.” Warhol, however, was not celebrating signifiers of American life in his 
work. Thomas Crow states that “To understand Pop in the early 1960s as a new realism 
or a return to figuration meant accepting a devalued status for the human body”:  
which had traditionally been the central concern and focus of figurative art. The 
restoration of reference to the world, offered in a defiance of the long march of advanced 
art toward abstraction, entailed granting manufactured products equal or superior status to 
the human beings who purchased and used them; Andy Warhol offered, albeit with a 
certain poignancy, the human figure already transformed into inert products.168  
 
Warhol, and Pop art, did not “typify” American life in the celebratory fashion Kefauver 
asserted. He lamented the effects of commodification on society. “Warhol came to 
produce his most powerful paintings,” writes Crow, “by dramatizing the hollowness of 
the consumer icon.”169 Warhol’s Flowers series did not embody his typically searing 
criticism of consumer culture170 and represents a tactful curatorial selection made by 
Kefauver, remaining dedicated to choosing artwork “to best represent American culture.” 
Warhol was “attracted to the open sores in American political life. The issues that were 
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most problematic for liberal Democratic politicians such as John and Robert 
Kennedy.”171 Kefauver was astute enough to recognize Warhol as a pivotal Pop artist and 
utilized his fame and artwork to “typify” American culture, but did not select artwork that 
captured the essence of his style and aims.  
 Following his capture of the grand prize at the Venice Biennale in 1964, 
Rauschenberg provided Kefauver appropriate fame to capitalize on. As the first American 
to win the grand prize since Whistler, Rauschenberg instantly assumed celebrity status. 
An AIEP catalog proclaims of Rauschenberg’s accomplishments: “Today one of the most 
famous of American artists; winner of the Venice Biennale (1964). Several qualities 
which distinguish his work—use of rags, rope, fans, and other items casually attached to 
his canvasses—have made him a leader in this avant-garde style.”172 His status as an icon 
in the art world made his art desirable to the AIEP, but they could not see past his 
artwork as more than “American.” Throughout his oeuvre Rauschenberg grapples with a 
host of issues, but one that would be particularly problematic for the AIEP were his 
inclusion of homosexual signifiers in his artwork. In his mixed media assemblage 
Canyon, 1959, Rauschenberg “melded patriotic and homoerotic emblems, exploiting the 
possibilities of immediate visual transcription offered by photographic silkscreen 
printing.”173 Rauschenberg challenged one of the foundational values of the U.S. Cold 
War utopian culture, the roles of breadwinner and homemaker, through homoerotic 
implications in his art and the relationship with his lover and artistic collaborator Jasper 
Johns. In an era when a monolithic, countrywide effort was needed to push the Civil 
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Rights Act of 1964 through to legislation to give rights to minorities and women, gay 
rights and advocacy were certainly not part of the national identity and are still excluded 
to this day. Asserting such alternative lifestyles should have disqualified Rauschenberg’s 
artwork from “typifying” U.S. culture, but the “Americaness” of his artwork remained, 
for Kefauver, its most pertinent aspect. 
 Like Rauschenberg and Warhol, Lichtenstein used representative signifiers of 
American culture in his artwork, but not in a celebratory manner as asserted by Kefauver. 
The curatorial decision to include his artwork is yet another example of art chosen for 
popularity, but removed from context. Lichtenstein did not target volatile political issues, 
but established himself in the realm of fine arts. Within this context Lichtenstein utilized 
his artwork to explore and dissect the content and medium of popular culture. What he 
discovered was that organic encounters with the world were readily being reshaped and 
defined by the imagery of mass culture.174 Like Warhol, Lichtenstein sought to 
demonstrate the hollow and disingenuous nature of the consumer icon. His trademark 
style of meticulously recreating comic book imagery can make it appear deceptively 
celebratory of American culture. It is not, however, a celebration or an attempt to connote 
American life in the sense Kefauver stated, but to critically evaluate it, even undermine 
its power.  
 Kefauver made similar curatorial decisions in selecting early twentieth century 
American art. In the early twentieth century an American style of art appeared which 
utilized urban realism to depict the seedy aspects of American life such as prostitutes, 
beggars, and scenes of poverty. This style and group of artists were dubbed the “Ashcan 
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School.” In making its selections for artwork, the AIEP tended to “screen out the more 
abrasive commentaries on shabby aspects of the American scene, such as some works of 
the Ashcan School.”175 In the early 1960s Ambassador William Benton176 planned to 
donate paintings by artist Reginald Marsh (1898-1954). Marsh painted scenes in the 
tradition of the Ashcan School, depicting urban life and its more sordid aspects.177 
Benton was, however, aware enough to present the AIEP with street and harbor scenes 
rather than Marsh’s notable paintings depicting the bowery and burlesque shows178 in 
New York City.  
 Four of the paintings Benton donated appeared in an AIEP exhibition at the 
Embassy in Copenhagen in 1967. Reginald Marsh’s paintings Christmas Shoppers (1), 
year unknown, Christmas Shoppers (2), year unknown, New York Sky-line with Tug in 
Foreground, year unknown, and Ferry-Boat Docked in River, year unknown, were 
exhibited along with a biography of the artist. The catalog states: “Fascinated by the life 
of New York, he has concentrated mainly on portraying character in people, places and 
things. His mastery of the body was based on constant observation and drawing, and on 
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thorough study of anatomy.”179 The catalog tactfully evades mentioning what Marsh is 
best known for while still paying tribute to his legacy. 
 Ad Reinhardt’s artistic achievements are equally avoided. The exhibition at the 
Embassy in Copenhagen was held the same year as Reinhardt’s death, 1967, by which 
time he had attracted substantial attention from the federal government for his political 
beliefs. A 123 page FBI file, of which only 100 pages is public, was compiled from 1941 
to 1966 which followed Reinhardt’s “subversive” activities. He was an avowed socialist 
and his file was marked “SM-C” or “Security Matter-C” which means: “According to the 
FBI, along with other government agencies, the subject constitutes a national security 
threat and is a subversive because his or her sympathies for communism and/or socialism 
make him or her a ‘potential’ collaborator with foreign agents.”180 The contributors to 
this file are as enlightening as its content. Reinhardt’s file contains was compiled by the 
FBI but incorporate substantial information from the State Department, foreign embassies 
of the United States, the U.S. Navy, and the Counter-Intelligence Branch of the U.S. 
Marine Corps.181 Considering that the Department Kefauver worked for contributed to 
the file on Reinhardt’s “subversive” activities, it is unfathomable that she was not aware 
of the attention being paid to him.  
 In spite of this Reinhardt was still included in the exhibition. The biographical 
catalog entry on him, however, reveals reluctance to expound his character. If the reader 
of the catalog entry on him knew nothing of Reinhardt, the only generalization they could 
draw is that he is American and deeply interwove in the art community in the U.S. The 
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entry on him merely includes his education, select exhibition locations, and select 
publications and journal entries.182 Nearly all other biographical entries, including 
Reginald Marsh, expel personal information. The only relevant information about 
Reinhardt is that he is extensively shown and published establishing his significance.  
 His artistic aims and roots in the New York School and Abstract Expressionism 
are secondary to the fact he is American. Reinhardt’s Black Series No. 5, year unknown, 
was his sole work in the exhibition and was part of his final development as an Abstract 
Expressionist. This artwork emerged from Reinhardt’s arrival in 1962 at what he 
designated “the final, ethically and logically impeccable form of painting,”: 
A Square (neutral, shapeless) canvas, five feet wide, five feet 
high…(not large, not small, sizeless), trisected (no composition), one 
horizontal form negating one vertical form (formless, no top, no 
bottom, directionless), three (more or less) dark (lightless) no-
contrasting (colorless) colors, brushwork brushed out to remove 
brushwork, a matte, flat, free-hand painted surface (glossless, 
textureless, non-linear, no hard edge, no soft edge).183 
 
A viewer must spend prolonged amounts of time in front of such a canvas before the 
surface reveals any differentiated detail. Thomas Crow writes how Reinhardt arrived at 
this because “he refused to subordinate his painting to any sort of instrumental 
commitment, least of all social commentary. Instead, only the most extreme refusal of 
art’s normal blandishments were for him a sufficient moral response to the plight of the 
artist in a society ruled by capital.”184 Reinhardt was seeking through his artwork a 
complete isolation from commodification.  
 Black Series No. 5 is intrinsically antithetical to the American capitalist culture 
meant to be displayed in the exhibition. The curatorial choices for displaying the artwork 
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reflect either a willfully negligent attitude toward Reinhardt and his artwork or a 
complete lack of understanding of his artistic aims. Black Series No. 5 was exhibited in 
what one can only describe the “miscellaneous” gallery at the Embassy in Copenhagen. 
According to the catalog, it was in a nondescript gallery, perhaps a hallway or foyer, on 
the second floor. Within that space was a selection of paintings not related by style or 
time period, but simply by being American. Black Series No. 5 was displayed alongside 
works by Sister Mary Corita, Reginald Marsh185, Evelyn Metzger, and David W. Stearns 
as well as photographs by Wynn Bullock and Cole Weston. Of the individual galleries in 
this exhibition, this gallery exhibits the least cohesion or context amongst the artwork.186 
Reinhardt’s Black Series No. 5 (Figure 3) has little in common with, for example, scenes 
of Christmas shoppers depicted by Marsh (Figure 4) or the vibrantly colored, childlike 
figures of Sister Mary Corita187 (Figure 5). These artists not only differ aesthetically, but 
do not belong to the same style or time period.  
 The AIEP actively avoided making such contextual distinctions in its curatorial 
practice. In a memo detailing a meeting with Leonard Carmichael, Secretary of the 
Smithsonian Institution, Robert H. Thayer states:  
He warned of the tremendous difficulties involved in getting into the field of 
contemporary American art due to the great controversy in that field and the extreme 
views of many of the most important people knowledgeable on the subject. He pointed 
out that people interested in American contemporary art seemed to look down their noses 
at anything else and he felt that the difficulties of getting a selection committee who 
would be sane on the topic of both eighteenth and nineteenth early American art and 
contemporary art would be almost insurmountable.188 
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Figure 4. Ad Reinhardt, Abstract Painting No. 5, 1962, oil on canvas, Collection of the 
Tate Britain Museum. This is not the painting that was shown in Copenhagen but is 























Figure 5. Reginald Marsh, Christmas Shoppers #2, undated, ink on paper, Gift of William 
















Figure 6. Sister Mary Corita Kent, For Eleanor, 1964, screen print, 29 5/8” x 39”, 
Harvard Art Museum. This is not the painting that was exhibited in Copenhagen. It is 










This was a common sentiment Thayer found during his preliminary study for the AIEP, 
that a curator or curatorial committee was likely to be unable to appropriately select 
traditional and contemporary works of art. The twenty person selection committee 
formed to find appropriate artwork incorporated a diverse number of individuals with 
vast expertise to inform the selection process.189 Ultimately, however, “The program 
attempted to reflect American democracy, steering clear of the art world’s internal 
politics and snobberies,”190 states Andrew Solomon writing on behalf of the AIEP. To 
“reflect democracy” and avoid “snobberies” is to exhibit American art simply for being 
made in the U.S., not for what it truly aims to signify (or not signify). This is a nearly 
official affirmation of the AIEP depoliticizing mid-century American avant-garde to 
render it appropriate for diplomacy.  
 Regardless of how it would be utilized, there was initiative to utilize avant-garde 
art from the earliest planning phase of the AIEP. In a correspondence from Thayer to 
Philip H. Coombs, Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Culture, he highlights 
the importance as well as the inherent risk of utilizing avant-garde art:  
It is of course true that any contemporary art is bound to arouse controversy and there 
will be individuals who feel that they can make political capital by starting and 
dramatizing such a controversy. However, it seems to me that the Department could 
fortify itself against such events by choosing an outstanding group of individuals to pass 
upon these paintings before they are accepted.  
There is plenty of good contemporary American art which would be difficult for anyone 
to attack. The United States today is unquestionably the center of contemporary art in the 
world and all young artists are looking to us for leadership in this field. I believe very 
strongly that this fact should be capitalized upon and that we should give the people of 
other lands an opportunity to see this example of American culture in our Embassies 
abroad.191 
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Thayer demonstrates an awareness of the contemporary art market in the early 1960s and 
one of the few references to artists’ stake in the matter, although it is of an exploitive 
nature. Statements made in other correspondence demonstrate Thayer was not interested 
in the artwork itself but only its “Americaness” when he decried “our embassies are 
woefully lacking in Americana” and:  
The President and Mrs. Kennedy have taken steps to bring the finest examples of 
American art into the White House. Since a Chief of Mission is the personal 
representative of the President abroad, it would seem most fitting that the same 
philosophy be applied to our embassies and that a concentrated attempt be made to have 
them truly represent the best in American culture.192 
 
These words were included in several correspondences to professionals in the art world 
asking for their opinion on an art in embassies program. The earliest initiatives of the 
AIEP were not focused on an appropriate exploration of avant-garde art, only an analysis 
of how best to utilize the newest American art. This sentiment pervaded into the AIEP 
when in a letter dated June 14, 1964 from Kefauver to Thayer she wrote “it is important 
that U.S. Embassies reflect various facets of current and traditional representative 
[emphasis added] North American art.”193 
 There was little or no curatorial considerations for context because there was a 
predetermined focus for every exhibition—American art. This focus was not just art 
made in the U.S. or reflective of American culture, but art of American culture. It is clear 
not all the contemporary artwork selected represented this agenda. The artwork instead 
was forced into a new and different context from its original artistic intent. Conversely, 
the AIEP would have failed to serve its purpose had it not included Warhol, Reinhardt, 
Rauschenberg, and others as they were part of the vast art scene in the U.S. in the 1960s.  
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 Such artists, however, were not utilized simply as another piece of the puzzle of 
representative American art. They were paraded in articles and interviews as the best of 
American art. The London Evening Star proclaimed “there is now a painting by ‘pop’ 
artist Andy Warhol on the walls of the United States Embassy in Madrid, and a black-on-
black ‘op’ canvas by Ad Reinhardt in the residence of Ambassador Chester Bowles in 
New Delhi.”194 The article continues: 
Now, under the direction of Nancy Kefauver, appointed to advise the State Department 
(and they needed some advice) on the fine arts, hundreds of modern American paintings 
are being sent out to United States embassies abroad to replace the familiar colour 
reproductions of George Washington and General Eisenhower.195 
 
A front page New York Times article proclaimed “When Ambassador and Mrs. Angier 
Biddle Duke took up their new post recently in Madrid, they adorned the walls of their 
embassy residence with a painting by Andy Warhol, the pop artist, plus works by other 
American contemporaries, including Josef Albers, Karl Zerbe, Larry Rivers and 
Alexander Calder.”196 The article also states:  
Thousands of Soviet citizens calling at Spaso House, the Moscow residence of 
Ambassador Foy D. Kohler, to see works by such artists George Bellows, Jasper Johns, 
and Willem de Kooning. An Ad Reinhardt black-on-black ‘op’ painting, in company with 
canvases by Stuart Davis, Ralston Crawford and Edward Hopper, jangles visitors to the 
residence of American Ambassador Chester Bowles in New Delhi.197 
 
Of these efforts Kefauver said “by giving concrete evidence of what’s doing in U.S. art, 
the program is strengthening our cultural image.”198 There is a lack of individual 
artworks by these prominent artists cited in the article. This is reflective of the AIEP 
which utilized the artists fame in the same manner, equatable to “name dropping.” While 
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these are not official State Department statements, they were no doubt endorsed and the 
information had to have been released.  
 The New York Times article allows insight into curatorial choices pertaining to 
exhibition techniques. Images accompanying the article provide rare glimpses of artwork 
on display in embassies. Figure 6199 depicts the Ambassador’s wife at Spaso House 
showing guests a Rauschenberg lithograph. One would not expect a “white cube” 
environment in a diplomatic residence but this lithograph is thoughtlessly positioned. It 
hangs far too high above eye level and over a radiator. This is not only a poor physical 
environment for a work on paper but does not provide an appropriate visual field for the 
viewer. There is also an end table with a portrait and other objects under the lithograph 
rendering it as an object amongst a group. This ignores the artwork’s independent 
characteristics and does not offer the viewer an appropriate opportunity to engage with 
the artwork. The same phenomenon takes place with another artwork pictured in the 
article. Figure 7200 shows Robert Goodnough’s 2R ‘64, year unknown, on exhibition in 
the Embassy office in London. Like Rauschenberg’s lithograph at Spaso, Goodnough’s 
painting is placed among other objects rendering it as part of a group. A bust of Abraham 
Lincoln by August Saint-Gaudens is on display in front of the painting, actually 
inhibiting a viewer from seeing all of it. This is not only disruptive, but a manifestation of 
the AIEP’s exhibiting American artwork for its “Americaness.” The American roots of 
the artwork are highlighted by placing them in such close proximity. This is exacerbated 
with the inclusion of the likeness of a prominent American such as President Lincoln. It 
is also a further instance of the AIEP presenting a conglomeration of American art with 
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no deeper context. Figure 8201 demonstrates a similar effect on Grace Hartigan’s Essex 
Market, 1956. While not as blatant as the effect on 2R ’64, Essex Market is shown in the 
New Delhi embassy hanging over furniture of a previous era and an elegant coffee or tea 
service on the table. This setting does not emphasize links between the objects as strongly 
as the London Embassy office, but there remains a connotation that the painting is part of 
a group, one consisting of American objects. The perspective of the images in Figures 7 
and 8 pervades the sense that the paintings and other objects in the room share an 
inherent American context. It is as if the photographer was aware (a distinct possibility) 















                                                          
























Figure 7. “Mrs. Foy D. Kohler, right, shows guests a lithograph, ‘Urban,’ by Robert 


























Figure 8. “‘2R ’64’, an abstract by Robert Goodnough, and a bust of Lincoln by Saint-





























Figure 9. “‘Essex Market,’ by Grace Hartigan, is one of the paintings in dining room of 


















 The AIEP embraced the curatorial practices established by MoMA for mid-
century American avant-garde artwork. MoMA’s curatorial practice focused on 
commodifying Abstract Expressionism in order to make it a powerful international 
diplomatic tool. Perceived as a commodity, Abstract Expressionist paintings were forced 
into the canon of American products made to represent the historical triumph of 
American capitalist society in the 1950s and 1960s. The AIEP naively continued this 
practice and applied it to Pop art, ignoring both styles’ anti-capitalist goals as well as 
their intellectually varied artistic aims in opposing capitalist society.  
 The AIEP maintained MoMA’s pro-capitalist theories through its selection 
process, exhibition of artwork, and interpretive practices for the artwork. Exhibitions 
produced by the AIEP implied that Abstract Expressionism and Pop art were logical 
outcomes of a capitalist society, but did little to clarify the controversies raging within 
American culture that these styles addressed. Nancy Kefauver selected artwork by the 
leading American avant-garde artists, but failed to maintain the artist’s and artwork’s 
context beyond being made in the U.S. By purposefully selecting popular artwork, then 
neglecting its roots through manifold curatorial decisions, the AIEP presented 
incompatible and at times opposing artwork within the same exhibitions to an 





AIEP abdicated its responsibilities to clearly and thoroughly depict American culture 
through its exhibitions, alternatively, depicting the U.S. and avant-garde art created 
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Artists included in MoMA’s 1953 exhibition 12 Modern American Painters and 
Sculptors shown in Oslo, Helsinki, Stockholm, Dusseldorf, Paris, and Zurich (April, 
1953-March, 1954): 
 
1. Ivan Albright 
2. Alexander Calder 
3. Stuart Davis 
4. Arshile Gorky 
5. Morris Graves 
6. Edward Hopper 
7. John Kane 
8. John Marin 
9. Jackson Pollock 
10. Theodore Roszak 
11. Ben Shahn 





Initial members of the MoMA’s International Council and their city of residence and 
known affiliations.  
 
 International Council Members 
1. Mrs. Gilbert W. Chapman, New York, donated artwork to MoMA’s collection 
and established the Mrs. Gilbert W. Chapman for purchasing artwork.  
2. Mr. Ralph F. Colin, New York, prominent art collector with large collection of 
prints, paintings, and sculpture.   
3. Mr. John de Menil, Houston, philanthropist, collector, and modern art advocate. 
4. Mr. Leonard C. Hanna, Jr., Cleveland: Oil, iron, shipping maganate and 
philanthropist. Served on advisory council of Cleveland Museum of Art1914-
1920, board of trustees 1920-1957 (year of death), and left a bequest of over $33 





5. Mrs. Walter Hochschild, New York, along with her husband, donated artwork and 
financial support to MoMA.  
6. Mrs. Gertrud A. Mellon, Greenwich, collector and philanthropist, donated artwork 
to MoMA and established the Mrs. Gertrud A. Mellon fund at the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, New York.  
7. Mrs. Richard Rodgers, New York, wife of composer Richard Rodgers. 
8. Mrs. John Rood, Minneapolis 
9. Mrs. Henry Potter Russell, San Francisco, member of U.S. National Committee 
for UNESCO.  
10. Mrs. Victor Zurcher, Chicago, active in modern arts advocacy in Chicago and 
supported artists such as Robert Motherwell.  
 
Vice-Chairmen also members of the Museum Board 
11. Mr. Wallace K. Harrison, architect and held close personal relationship with 
Nelson Rockefeller, which likely lead to many of his commissions.  
12. Mr. James Thrall Soby, critic, author, collector, and patron of the arts, he had 
been involved with MoMA selection committees since 1940.  
13. Mrs. Samuel A. Marx. 
14. Mrs. Bliss Parkinson. 
15. Mrs. John D. Rockefeller 3rd – Chairman, wife of John D. Rockefeller 3rd, son of 





Artists included in MoMA’s 1958 exhibition The New American Painting shown in 
Basel, Milan, Madrid, Berlin, Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris, London, and New York 
(April, 1958-March, 1959): 
 
1. William Baziotes 
2. James Brooks  
3. Sam Francis  
4. Arshile Gorky 
5. Adolph Gottlieb 
6. Philip Guston 
7. Grace Hartigan 
8. Franz Kline  
9. Willem de Kooning 
10. Robert Motherwell 
11. Barnett Newman 
12. Jackson Pollock  
13. Mark Rothko 
14. Theodoros Stamos 
15. Clyfford Still 
16. Bradley Walker Tomlin 







Initial Executive Committee and Accessions Committee members for the AIEP at their 
establishment in 1965.  
 
Executive Committee 
1. Nancy Kefauver 
2. David Scott, Director, National Collection of Fine Arts, Washington D.C. 
3. Lloyd Goodrich, Director, Whitney Museum of American Art, New York. 
 
Accessions Committee 
1. Perry Rathbone, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston 
2. Sue S. Thurman, Institute of Contemporary Arts, Boston 
3. Bartlett H. Hayes, Addison Gallery of American Art, Andover, MA 
4. Richard Collins, director of arts and sciences, IBM 
5. Robert H. Thayer, former assistant to Secretary of State Dulles 
6. Janet Ruben, Obelisk Gallery, Washington, D.C.  
7. Roy Moyer, American Federation of Arts, New York 
8. Katherine Kuh, art editor of Saturday Review, New York 
9. Edward Rust, Academy of Art, Tennessee  
10. Gudmund Vigtel, High Museum of Art, Atlant 
11. Rexford Stead, Museum of Fine arts, St. Petersburg, Florida 
12. Otto Wittman, Toledo Museum of Art, Toledo, Ohio 
13. Norman de Haan, architect, Chicago 
14. Laurence Sickman, Nelson Gallery of Art, Kansas City, Missourri 
15. Eugene Kingman, Joslyn Art Museum, Omaha, Nebraska 
16. Donald Goodall, University of Texas art Department, Austin 
17. Dorothy Dunn, honorary associate in Indian arts, Los Altos, California 
18. Richard Brown, Los Angeles County Museum, Los Angeles 
19. Paul Mills, Oakland Art Museum, Oakland 
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